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Wade: Women Denied Partnerships Revisited: A Response to Professors Mad

WOMEN DENIED PARTNERSHIPS
REVISITED: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSORS MADEK AND O'BRIEN
David R. Wade*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employment
discrimination by private employers and federal and state governments on the basis of race, color, religion, sex and national origin.'
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,2 a black female3 first had her partnership bid placed on hold and later was denied reconsideration for
partnership in the accounting firm of Price Waterhouse in violation
of Title VII. A plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court determined that
decision-makers permitted negative gender stereotypes to play a motivating part in their employment decision.' The Court found that
"[li]n the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts
on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that
* Assistant Professor, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois; B.A. Grinnell College; M.A. Duquesne University; J.D. University of Iowa College of Law.
1. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988). Title VII does not cover employers with
less than 15 employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The 1972 Amendments broadened the statute's prohibitions to include "governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1988).
2. 618 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985), afJ'd in part, rev'd in part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C.
Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
3. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
4. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1779. Partners were invited to submit written evaluations of each partnership candidate and decisions were essentially derived from a
109 S. Ct. at 1781. Negative stereotypical
consensus of these evaluations. 490 U.S. at -,
comments appeared in the partner's evaluations and included criticisms that she was too
"macho" and that she "overcompensated for being a woman." Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 111617. One partner advised her to take "a course at charm school". Id. at 1117. The man who
bore the responsibility to explain the Board's decision to Hopkins advised her to "walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled,
and wear jewelry." Id. at 1117. Dr. Susan Fiske, a social psychologist and Associate Professor
of Psychology at Carnegie-Mellon University testified that these comments as well as other
aspects of Price Waterhouse's selection process were likely influenced by sex stereotyping. Id.
The district court concluded that sex stereotyping was at work. Id. at 1120.
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she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender." 5 The Court held
that "once a plaintiff . . . shows that gender played a motivating
part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding
of liability only by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a role."' In cases
of individual disparate treatment,7 Hopkins establishes an alternative to the scheme of litigation crafted in McDonnell Douglas v.
Green8 and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine9
5. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at -_,109 S. Ct. at 1790-91. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion
in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined. Id. at -,
109 S. Ct. at 1780.
Justices White and O'Connor each filed separate concurring opinions. Id. at -,
109 S. Ct.
at 1795-96. Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. Id. at -,
109 S. Ct. at 1806. The Court found that decisions
based on such stereotypes constituted discrimination based on sex. Id. at -,
109 S. Ct. at
1791. The plurality adopts the view that a plaintiff must show that gender played a "motivating part in an employment decision." Id. The plurality offers no comment on the substantiality
of the illegitimate motivation a plaintiff must show. Id. at __, 109 S. Ct. at 1790. Instead,
the plurality places the determination of substantiality within the defendant's rebuttal burden
requiring the defendant to dispel an illegitimate motive's substantiality by proving that "even
if it had not taken [an illegitimate motive] into account, it would have come to the same
decision." For the plurality, if the illegitimate factor was simply among the employer's reasons
at the time of making the decision, the illegitimate factor was a motivating part of the employment decision. 490 U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1787-88; see infra notes 33 & 34 and accompanying text (discussing competing definitions of causation). See also CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1990 as passed by House § 5 S.2104, 101 Cong., 1st Sess. 1990, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
153, at D-1 (Aug. 8, 1990) (adopting the plurality view than an impermissible motive must
only be a contributing factor even though there were other factors as well).
6. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at , 109 S. Ct. at 1787. The Court finds that two circuits
require clear and convincing evidence while nine circuits require either a preponderance of the
evidence or make no mention of any evidentiary standard. Id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1784 n.2.
The Court adopts the latter view endorsing the preponderance standard. Id. at -,
109 S.
Ct. at 1791-93; see infra notes 36 & 37 and accompanying text (discussing the employer's
rebuttal burden).
7. Disparate treatment means that an employer treats some people less favorably than
others because of their race, sex, religion or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is
crucial. Such a motive may be inferred from statistical evidence and from unexplained differences in treatment. Such inferential uncovering of discriminatory motive is not limited to the
employment context. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 265-66 (1977) (finding discriminatory intent in de facto segregation in housing).
Disparate treatment is distinguishable from disparate impact. In impact cases, a facially
neutral rule, practice or device disproportionately disadvantages minority members and is not
justified by business necessity. Proof of a discriminatory motive is not required. Disparate impact attacks practices fair in form but discriminatory in effect. Compare Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971) with McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-06 (1973).
8. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, the employer laid off Green as part of a
general reduction in the employer's workforce. Id. at 794. Green, a long time civil rights activist protested the lay-off and, as part of this protest, joined with members of the Congress on
Racial Equality and engaged in an illegal "stall-in" and "lock-in" blocking ingress and egress
of the employer's business premises. Id. Subsequently, business conditions improved and the
employer placed advertisements seeking qualified mechanics but rejected Green's application
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In a recent article, Professors Madek and O'Brien explore the
principles announced in Hopkins within the specific context of alleged gender discrimination in promotions from associate to part-

ner.' 0 The authors identify two thresholds women must cross to attain equal opportunity for entry into "the highest echelons of the

professions in this country."" While finding women have crossed the
first threshold, standing to sue under Title VII for discrimination

when applying for admission to a partnership,

2

the authors find

women's crossing of the second threshold, the grounds upon and the

3
rules by which such suits can be worn, more problematic.' Ultimately the authors conclude that while the second threshold has not
been crossed, the doorbell has been rung, the door opened and
4
women are "struggling through that second threshold."
The authors' examination is under-inclusive in several significant ways. First, the authors overestimate the effect Hopkins will
exert on decision-makers considering promotions from associate to
partner. This Article will first examine the doctrinal development of
individual disparate treatment cases. This Article will then explore

the doctrinal changes effected by Hopkins in mixed-motive cases.

Lastly, this Article will explore the relatively easy ways decisionfor re-employment. Id. at 796. Green brought suit claiming that McDonnell Douglas refused
to rehire him because of his race and persistent involvement in the civil rights movement. Id.
at 797. McDonnell Douglas is generally considered to have established the basic allocation of
burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case of individual disparate treatment. Id. at 802.
9. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). In Burdine, plaintiff brought suit alleging that the failure to
promote her and the subsequent decision to terminate her were premised on gender discrimination. Id. at 251. Employer, in order to retain federal funding, was forced to reorganize plaintiff's department to eliminate inefficiencies. Id. at 250. As part of this reorganization, a Project
Director was appointed and the entire staff was reorganized. Id. Plaintiff applied for the position of Project Director. Id. A man was hired instead and plaintiff was fired along with two
other employees ostensibly because they were contributors to the prior inefficiency. Id. at 25051. Plaintiff was later rehired but assigned to another division of the agency. Id. at 251.
10. Madek & O'Brien, Women Denied Partnerships:From Hishon to Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 7 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 257 (1990) [hereinafter Women Denied].
11. See Women Denied, supra note 10, at 258. While speaking of the highest echelons,
the authors limit their examination to female applications for partner status. Id. at 258-59.
The authors ignore the difficulties of women's progression up the ladder in sole proprietorships,
corporations and other forms of business organizations.
12. See generally Women Denied, supra note 10, at 257-73 (discussing this first hurdle).
Standing in such a case requires that consideration for partnership be part of the "terms,
conditions or privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). This requirement
is met if a firm uses the possibility of partnership to induce an associate to join the firm. See
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 476 U.S. 69, 74-75 (1984).
13. See generally Women Denied, supra note 10, at 274-302 (discussing the second
hurdle).
14. Women Denied, supra note 10, at 301.
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makers may avoid Hopkins' more onerous burdens.
Second, by limiting their examination to Hopkins, the authors
fail to note recent disparate impact"6 decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court and their significance in cases involving allegedly discriminatory denials of admission to partner status. This Article will examine
these cases and note their probable applications.
Third, the authors underestimate the doctrinal applications and
force of the decision in Hopkins on other areas of discriminatory
treatment. Changes in these areas may have significant effects on
partnership decisions in ways the authors fail to recognize. This Article will explore these broader applications and their possible impact
on partnership promotion decisions. Specifically, this Article will discuss the ripple effects of Hopkins on the affirmative action doctrine,
retaliation doctrine and explore the window of opportunity Hopkins
offers for Title VII protection of homosexuals.
II.

INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE TREATMENT

A.

Established Doctrine

The scheme of litigation in an individual disparate treatment
case was first established in McDonnell Douglas v. Green.'6 The
plaintiff, during the prima facie case,' 7 must demonstrate membership in a protected class, application and minimal qualifications for
the position, rejection, and that the employer continued to seek applicants or filled the position with someone else.' 8 This four-part test
"eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the
plaintiff's rejection," lack of qualifications and absence of a vacancy. 9 Satisfaction of these four prima facie elements gives rise
inferentially to a rebuttable presumption2 o of intentional
15. See supra note 7 (discussing the distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact).
16. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
17. The phrase "prima facie case" in the Title VII context describes "the plaintiff's
burden of producing enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue."
Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7.
18. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. While these prima facie elements were not
established in challenges to allegedly discriminatory promotion from associate to partner, the
district court in Hopkins applied these elements in such a case. 618 F. Supp. at 1113.
19. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254; see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431

U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977) (stating that though "the McDonnell Douglas formula does not
require direct proof of discrimination, it does demand . . . that his rejection did not result

from the two most common legitimate reasons

. . .

an absolute or relative lack of qualifica-

tions or the absence of a vacancy.").
20. A rebuttable presumption is a traditional device used in the common law for allocat-

ing the burden of production. See F.

JAMES

& G.

HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE
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discrimination.21
The defendant/employer, to rebut this presumption of intentional discrimination, has a burden to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's rejection.22 It is not
required that the employer persuade the factfinder that the stated
reason is the actual reason for rejection. 23 If the employer satisfies

his rebuttal burden of production, plaintiff has an opportunity to persuade the factfinder, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

employer's stated reason is merely pretext to disguise intentional discrimination.24 Pretext is shown through adducing evidence of the
employer's past discrimination against the particular plaintiff involved in the suit, statistical evidence sufficient to persuade the trier
(2d. ed. 1977) (footnote omitted); see also FED. R. EVID. 301. See generally J.WIGMORE,
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN COMMON LAW § 2491 (3d ed. 1940). In a Title
VII case, such a presumption helps to sharpen the factual inquiry into the presence or absence
of discriminatory intent. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55 n.8.
21. "[W]hen a number of potential causes are eliminated an inference arises that an
illegitimate factor was in fact the motivation behind . . . the decision." Hopkins, 490 U.S. at
109 S. Ct. at 1801 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). See Furnco Constr.
-,
Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (stating that the prima facie case "raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more
likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors.") (citation omitted).
22. In Burdine, the Court noted that the "defendant's explanation of its legitimate reasons must be clear and reasonably specific." 450 U.S. at 258. The defendant must produce
evidence sufficient which "raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against
the plaintiff." Id. at 254-55; accord McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 802. See also Teamsters,
431 U.S. 324, 342 n.24 (holding that the defendant's general claims of good faith consisting of
"general statements that it hired only the best qualified applicants" were inadequate to rebut
an inference of discriminatory intent); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972) (stating that "affirmations of good faith in making individual selections are insufficient to dispel a
prima facie case of systemic exclusion.") (citations omitted).
23. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254; Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 29 (1978)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 802-03. It is important to recognize
that the burden on the defendant in rebuttal is merely one of production and not of persuasion.
See FED. R. EvID. 301. Both are burden of proof components. The distinction between a burden of production and a burden of persuasion is critical in assessing the significance of
Hopkins.
, 109 S. Ct. at 1801 (O'Connor, J.,concurring) (quoting
24. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804); see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. McDonnell Douglas
109 S.
and Burdine cases are often referred to as "pretext" cases. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at -,
stated
Court
the
Burdine,
In
light.
is
very
burden
facie
prima
the
cases,
such
Ct. at 1789. In
that, "[T]he burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous."
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. Similarly, the defendant's rebuttal burden is also light. Id. at 25455. The employer's burden is satisfied if he simply "explains what he has done" or "producefs]
evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons." Sweeney, 439 U.S. at 28-29 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Thus, the plaintiff need only establish easy factual predicates and the defendant
need simply produce any nondiscriminatory reason. Id. The case often turns on the persuasiveness of pretext evidence allowing the factfinder to confidently infer discriminatory intent in the
absence of an admission or smoking gun.
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of fact of a pattern or practice of discrimination by the defendant 25
and testimonial evidence of bad comments.26

At the close of evidence, the trier of fact makes the factual finding of the presence or absence of intentional discrimination.2 7 It is
without dispute that, under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdinescheme
of litigation, the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at
all times." It is further without dispute that a finding of intentional
discrimination is arrived at inferentially by the trier of fact on the
basis of circumstantial or statistical evidence. 29 Rarely will an employer in language or in script admit intentional discrimination.30
B. The Effects of Hopkins
The plurality decision in Hopkins established an alternative
scheme of litigation in "mixed-motive"a1 cases of individual dispa25. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05. Such a statistical showing is the essence of
a plaintiff's prima facie case in a class action rather than an individual challenge to alleged
disparate treatment. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324; Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,
433 U.S. 299 (1977).
26. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989 (1988) (noting that
plaintiff was apparently told that the teller position involved "a lot of money ... for blacks to
have to count.") (citation omitted); Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 1975)
(finding a supervisor commented that "[clolored people are hired to clean because they clean
better, or words to that effect.").
27. Such a factual finding is subject to a "clearly erroneous" standard on appeal. FED.
R. Civ. P. 52(a). A factual finding is clearly erroneous when "the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). "If the district court's
account of the evidence is plausible ... the court of appeals may not reverse it even though
convinced that ... it would have weighed the evidence differently." Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985).
28. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 1802 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Id.
at 1810 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; Sweeney, 439 U.S. at 29;
cf Watson, 487 U.S. at 991 (stating that in cases of disparate impact "the ultimate burden of
proving that discrimination against a protected group has been caused by a specific employment practice remains with the plaintiff at all times.").
29. It is never directly proven that the employer intentionally discriminated because
there is no "smoking gun" nor any admission by the defendant. Rather, we infer intentional
discrimination when the plaintiff successfully eliminates all the common legitimate justifications for the adverse employment decision and the defendant fails to produce evidence of a less
obvious or common justification for the decision. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44. (stating
that the McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of discrimination).
30. The exception to this rule is on cases of retaliation in which an employee is intentionally discriminated against because of unreasonable conduct in opposition to arguable violations of Title VII. In such cases, the employer often admits intentional discrimination but
succeeds in justifying it. See infra notes 185-227 and accompanying text (discussing
retaliation).
31. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 1791-92. While this is the first time the
Supreme Court has considered a "mixed-motive" case, the circuits have considered such cases.
See Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985); Blalock v. Metal Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d
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rate treatment. In mixed-motive cases, both legitimate and illegiti-

mate factors are considered by decision-makers in reaching an employment decision.32 In such mixed-motive cases, the plaintiff must

persuade the factfinder, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an
illegitimate factor played a "motivating part in [the] employment
decision"' 3 or was a "substantial factor" 34 considered by a decision703 (6th Cir. 1985); Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1983).
109 S. Ct. at 1785. Illegitimate factors include the
32. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at -,
sex, religion and national origin. Id. at -, 109
race,
VII:
Title
in
identified
classes
protected
S. Ct. at 1787 n.9. Legitimate factors presumably consist of everything else. Id. The significance of Hopkins lies in the Court's inclusion of a broadened definition of stereotypes concerning the protected classes among the illegitimate factors. See infra notes 231-40 and accompanying text (discussing stereotypes); see also infra notes 35, 59 & 242 and accompanying text.
In Hopkins, illegitimate stereotypes appeared in partner's written evaluations of partnership
candidates. 618 F. Supp. at 1116-19. At trial, legitimate factors advanced by the defendant for
Hopkins' rejection included abrasiveness and inadequate interpersonal skills. Id. at 1113. Evidence adduced at trial indicated Hopkins had improved in these areas as well as establishing
that Hopkins had been instrumental in attracting new contracts for the firm. Id. at 1112-13.
33. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1790. The Court offers conflicting analyses
of the causation issue. Id. The plurality exhaustively canvassed conflicts among circuit courts
of appeal as to the standard of causation finding that four circuits require a plaintiff to show
that "but-for" the discriminatory motive, the decision would have been in his favor. Id. at
109 S. Ct. at 1784 n.2. Seven circuits require only that the discriminatory motive be a
-,
"substantial" or "motivating" factor. Id. The Hopkins plurality opinion denies that the statutory language "because of" means "but-for" causation which, would be tantamount to mean109 S. Ct. at 1785. Instead, the plurality holds that an
ing "solely because of." Id. at -,
employment decision is "because of" sex when one of the reasons supporting the decision is the
109 S. Ct. at 1790; see also supra note 5 (discussing the term
candidate's gender. Id. at -,
"motivating"). Justice O'Connor finds that despite "the plurality's dictum that the words 'because of' do not mean 'but-for' causation; manifestly they do." Id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1797.
The dissent finds that despite "the plurality's rhetoric . . . denouncing a 'but-for' standard of
causation . . . [t]he theory . . . the plurality adopts . . . essentially incorporates the 'but-for'
109 S. Ct. at 1806. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent finds that
standard." Id. at -,
109 S. Ct. at 1809. Professors
"because of" does mean "but-for" causation. Id. at -,
Madek and O'Brien exhaustively discuss the differing views of causation offered by the Court.
See Women Denied, supra note 10, at 284-300.
109 S. Ct. at 1795 (White, J., concurring); id. at
34. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at -,
109 S. Ct. at 1796 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justices O'Connor and Whites' "substan-,
tial factor" requires that the illegitimate factor play more of a role in an employment decision
109 S. Ct. at 1795-96, 1796than the plurality opinion's "motivating part". See id. at -,
1801. The dissent takes issue with this evidentiary standard finding it fatally vague and requir109
ing "the generation of a jurisprudence of the meaning of 'substantial factor' ". Id. at -,
S. Ct. at 1812.
The Court has applied this causation standard in a first amendment case, where the burden is on plaintiff to show that first amendment conduct is a "substantial factor" or a "motivating factor" in the employment decision. Mount Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274.(1977). The Court has also applied this causation standard to fourteenth amendment
claims. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21
(1977), The Court further applies it to unfair labor practices. See NLRB v. Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 399-400 (1983).
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maker at the time of making the adverse employment decision. Hopkins further endorses the view that stereotypes based on gender, racial, religion or national origin, when relied on by a decision-maker,
are examples of such illegitimate factors.35
If the plaintiff is successful in establishing a mixed-motive decision, the defendant/employer must do more than simply produce a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's rejection. In
order to "avoid a finding of liability, [the employer must prove] by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not taken the plaintiffs gender into ac' The plaintiff
count."36
retains the opportunity, in surrebuttal, to persuade the factfinder that the reason advanced by the employer was
merely pretext to disguise intentional discrimination.)
The plurality "refrains from deciding

. . .

which specific facts,

35. While Hopkins expands the definition of impermissible stereotype, such stereotypes
have constituted Title VII violations in previous cases. See Los Angeles Dept. of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 347 (1977);
Phillips v. Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. 542 (1971); see also Slack v. Havens 522 F.2d 1091
(9th Cir. 1975); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971). See infra
notes 232-40 and accompanying text (discussing how Hopkins expands what constitutes a
stereotype).
36. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1795. A similar burden has been placed on
employers by several courts of appeals. See, e.g., Blalock, 775 F.2d at 712 (holding "that in
order to prove violation of Title VII, a plaintiff need demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that the employer's decision
was more likely than not motivated by a criterion
proscribed by the statute). "Upon such proof, the employer has the burden to prove that the
adverse employment action would have been taken even in the absence of the impermissible
motivation."Id. See Miles, 750 F.2d at 875-76 (noting that "where a case of discrimination is
proved by direct evidence . . . [t]he employer can then rebut only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would have been reached even absent the presence
of the discriminatory motive."); see also supra note 5 (discussing the conflicting rebuttal burdens among the circuit courts of appeal). The Court applied this burden in Mount Healthy.
"[T]he Board [must show] by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the
same decision . . . even in the absence of the protected conduct." Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at
287. The Court has applied this rebuttal burden to Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n.21,
and TransportationManagement, 462 U.S. at 399-400.
37. The plurality denies that this is a burden-shifting scheme. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at
-,
109 S. Ct. at 1788. Instead, they consider the employer's burden to be of the nature of
an affirmative defense in which "the plaintiff must persuade the factfinder on one point [decision-maker considered an illegitimate factor] and the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must
persuade it on another [that the same decision would have been made in the absence of the
illegitimate factor]." Id. Justice O'Connor also similarly provides that the defendant may, in
the nature of an affirmative defense, defeat such a prima facie showing of "but-for" causation
by proving the decision would have been the same in the absence of the illegitimate factor. 490
U.S. at -,
109 S. Ct. at 1800. The dissent rejects the creation of an affirmative defense by
the plurality and O'Connor's concurrence imposing on the defendant a burden of persuasion
while approving the current McDonnell Douglas' imposition of only a burden of production.
Id. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 1809.
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'standing alone,' would or would not establish a plaintiff's case." 8 It
is thus unclear what sort of evidence would be sufficient to shift a
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine case into a Hopkins scheme. Justice
O'Connor, in her concurrence, identifies "direct" evidence as necessary to invoke the Hopkins scheme of litigation. 9 The dissent finds
this evidentiary distinction ambiguous and likely to generate as

much confusion as clarity.4"
It is similarly unclear when, during the course of litigation, the

trier of fact makes the determination of which scheme applies to the
given case. This is a particularly important issue in that the defendant is left, throughout the litigation, in a position of ignorance regarding their evidentiary burden. Specifically, will the employer be
forced merely to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse employment decision under the McDonnell
, 109 S. Ct. at 1791. The plurality refrains from this determination be38. Id. at cause, in Hopkins, such a decision was unnecessary. The employer did not deny that decisionmakers had considered Hopkins' "aggressiveness" in deciding to deny her a promotion to partner. The plurality does state that "[r]emarks at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not
inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular employment decision." Id. The plurality favorably cites O'Connor's requirement of direct evidence. Id.; see infra note 39 and
accompanying text (discussing direct evidence). But see infra note 40 and accompanying text
(rejecting such an evidentiary distinction).
109 S. Ct. at 1805. Justice O'Connor makes clear that "stray
39. 490 U.S. at -,
remarks in the workplace statements by non-decisionmakers [and] testimony such as Dr.
Fiske's in this case, standing alone, . . . [would] justify shifting the burden of persuasion to
the employer." Id.at __, 109 S. Ct. at 1804-05. Such evidence may be probative of sexual
harassment and important at the surrebuttal phase of a McDonnell Douglas/Burdine individ109 S. Ct.
ual disparate treatment case or a systemic disparate treatment case." Id. at -,
at 1804. Justice O'Connor would require "direct evidence that decisionmakers placed substan109
tial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision." Id. at -,
S. Ct. at 1805. She takes special pains to distinguish such "direct" evidence from the statistical evidence required of the plaintiff in establishing a prima facie case under the theories of
109 S. Ct. at 1803-06.
systemic disparate treatment or disparate impact. Id. at -,
Several courts of appeal have taken a similar view. See, e.g., Dybcyzak v. Tuskegee Inst.,
737 F.2d 1524, 1528 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985) (holding that statistics are not direct evidence); Johnson v. Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 731 F.2d 64, 69 n.6 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984) (stating that statistical evidence is circumstantial); Clay v.
Hyatt Regency Hotel, 724 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 1984). But see Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d
1091 (9th Cir. 1975). The racially discriminatory comments of plaintiffs' immediate supervisor
were held to constitute direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Id. at 1095. Plaintiff's general
supervisor, not their immediate supervisor, made the decision to terminate the plaintiffs. Id.
40. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1812. The dissent finds that "[c]ourts will
be required to make the often subtle and difficult distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' or 'circumstantial' evidence [and the] [a]ddition of a second burden-shifting mechanism
• . .is not likely to lend clarity to the process." Id. Indeed, the dissent's concerns over subsequent confusion appear well-founded. In their dissent in Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
109 S. Ct. 2115, 2131 (1989) the same four Justices joining in the Hopkins plurality opinion
find that the employer has no independent burden of persuasion even if the employee produces
direct evidence of discriminatory intent.
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Douglas/Burdinescheme or persuade the factfinder it is more likely
than not the actual reason under the Hopkins scheme? The plurality
and concurrence soft-pedal the significance of this problem finding
that the employer, regardless of whether McDonnell Douglas or
Hopkins framework applies, has "every incentive to convice the trier
of fact that the decision was lawful." 41 The plurality decision offers
little guidance and addresses this issue only obliquely in a footnote.42
Justice O'Connor indicates that the structure of the presentation of
evidence in a mixed-motive case "should conform to the general outlines . . . established in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. '43 Then
once "all the evidence has been received, the court should determine
whether the McDonnell Douglas or Hopkins framework property
applies. 44 Within these general outlines, any direct evidence of discriminatory animus should be presented by the plaintiff when making the prima facie case. Then, the defendant should present its rebuttal case consisting of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the adverse employment decision. A prudent defendant must assume
a worst case scenario in which the rebuttal burden will be one of
persuasion and not simply production. The dissent takes issue with
this loose guidance counseling continued adherence to the McDonnell Douglas/Burdinescheme of litigation. 45
C. Hopkins Applied and Avoided
On the one hand, the analytic differences between the plurality,
concurring and dissenting opinions in Hopkins as to the type of evidence46 and the degree of causation, 47 required in a mixed-motive
case will likely generate interesting legal scholarship. 48 On the other
41. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at -. , 109 S. Ct. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248). This observation takes little account of the significant difference
between merely producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and proving it
was the actual reason for its decision. Id.
42. See id. at-,
109 S.Ct. at 1789 n.12 (stating that "nothing in this opinion should
be taken to suggest that a case must be correctly labeled as either a 'pretext' case or a 'mixed
motives' case from the beginning in the district court; instead, we expect that plaintiffs often

will allege, in the alternative, that their cases are both. .

.

. [and] at some point . . . the

District Court must decide.").
43. Id. at _, 109 S.Ct. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
44. Id.
45. See id. at , 109 S.Ct. at 1812-13.
46. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 5, 33 & 34 and accompanying text.
48. See generally Women Denied, supra note 10. See also Cohen, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins: Mixed Motive DiscriminationCases, the Shifting Burden of Proofand Sexual Stereotyping, 40 LAB. L.J. 723 (1989); Note, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: Causation and Burdens of Proof in Title VII Mixed Motive Cases, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 501 (1989).
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hand, because of the ease by which decision-makers can actually or
apparently eschew reliance on impermissible stereotypes, Hopkins'

effect on actual partnership decisions will be minimal.49

In Hopkins, a finding of liability was predicated solely on the

existence and effect of sexist stereotypes in partners' written evaluations. 50 Lack of interpersonal skills caused Hopkins' rejection. 51 Hopkins was perceived as lacking interpersonal skills because of gender
stereotypes. 52 Thus, gender stereotypes caused her rejection. 53 The
trial court found that Price Waterhouse did not discourage sexist

stereotyping, 4 did not acknowledge nor interrogate partner's evaluations for gender-based stereotyping, 55 and routinely permitted such
evaluations.56 These trial
stereotyping to play a role in partnership
57
appeal.
on
court findings were affirmed
In a factually analogous case, a partnership could avoid the application of Hopkins principles by taking two simple steps. First,
49. While Hopkins is an interesting decision, it is more a case of form over substance. In
the context of partnership decisions, Hopkins' force will be de minimis. See Hopkins, 490 U.S.
109 S. Ct. at 1775.
at -,
50. See generally 618 F. Supp. at I111-21. Even though the 48 standardized criteria
included criteria pertaining to interpersonal skills, the concerns over interpersonal skills eventually leading to Ms. Hopkins' rejection were not derived from those standardized rankings but
rather from the partners' written comments accompanying the standardized criteria. See id. at
1116-19; see also supra note 4 and infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (discussing
Price Waterhouse's selection process).
51. 618 F. Supp. at 1113. Price Waterhouse never disputed that Ms. Hopkins was qualifor partnership. Id. Her candidacy would probably have been successful but for the comfied
plaints about her interpersonal skills. Id. Price Waterhouse, while not conceding that interpersonal skills were Hopkin's sole deficiency, does concede such skills were the principle and
determinative reason for rejection. Id. at 1115.
52. See id. at 1120 (discussing that while Price Waterhouse may legitimately emphasize
interpersonal skills in its partnership decisions, in Ms. Hopkins' case they did so in an illegitimate, stereotypical way).
53. See id. at 1116 (finding that "[negative] comments are treated as serious reservations and given great weight"). "'No' votes, even from short form commentators who may
only have very limited contact with the candidate, often result in a 'no' or 'hold' decision. ...
[N]o votes and negative comments, largely from partners outside OGS [Office of Government
Services], effectively placed the plaintiff toward the bottom of the candidate pool." Id. It is
presumed that negative comments are strongly and positively correlated with no votes. Id.
54. See id. at 1117 (noting that one partner repeatedly expressed his view that women
should not be considered seriously for partnership and were incapable of even being senior
managers and that the firm did not discourage such comments and recorded his vote in the
overall summary of evaluations).
55. See id. at 1118-19.
56. See id. at 1117 (stating that "the Admissions Committee rejected at least two other
women candidates because partners believed that they were curt, brusque and abrasive."); see
also id. at 1115 (discussing that two male candidates who were criticized for being aggressive,
overbearing, abrasive or crude were recommended by the Policy Board and were elected
partners).
57. Hopkins, 825 F.2d 458, 464 (1987).
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strike out those comments in partner's evaluations which seem, in
any measure, to partake of gender-based 5 stereotypes. 58 This should
defeat any inference that such conmments "caused" the adverse em-

ployment decision. Second, return those evaluations betraying sexist
stereotypes to the partners with a memo discouraging such expression.6 0 This should generate evidence that the partnership is taking
all reasonable steps to educate decision-makers of the offensiveness
of stereotyping and to discourage such stereotyping in the future.
In this sense, Hopkins may serve the purpose of attuning decision-makers to the existence of sexism, but it may or may not act to
discourage its effect. 6 ' Partners may continue to indulge sexist stereotypes so long as they make an effort to conceal their indulgence
by excising such stereotypes from tangible evaluation materials and
discouraging their expression. 2 Plaintiffs will, in most cases, be left
58. While gender-based stereotypes were at issue in Price Waterhouse, race-based, religion-based and national origin-based stereotypes would be treated the same. See, e.g., Hishon
v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (ruling that decisions concerning advancement to
partnership are governed by Title VII and therefore must be made without regard to race, sex,
religion or national origin).
59. See Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1119 (discussing the agreement in both plurality and
concurring opinions that stray stereotypical comments in the workplace by non-decisionmakers
are insufficient, in themselves, to constitute a violation of Title VII); see supra notes 38-39 and
accompanying text (discussing this agreement). Both the plurality and Justice O'Connor find
that it is a decision-maker's reliance on such stereotypes when reaching an employment decision which constitutes the violation. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at -,
109 S. Ct. at 1791, 1805.
A third alternative also exists. Price Waterhouse could eliminate their request for comments explaining partner's recommendation to accept, reject or hold a candidate. While stereotypes may subconsciously influence a partner's numerical evaluation of a candidate on the
subjective though neutral criteria, the elimination of comments will preclude such stereotypes
from being a matter of direct discussion and consideration. Eliminating such comments doubly
serves the employer's interest. First, it decreases the possibility that such stereotypes will influence the decision-making process, thus promoting compliance with the remedial goals of Title
Vii. See infra note 198 and accompanying text. Second, it eliminates the direct or inferential
evidence necessary to a plaintiff's disparate treatment claim. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
Such comments are not completely irrelevant in discrimination cases. In a McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine scheme, such comments are relevant when the plaintiff endeavors to prove
that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason advanced by the employer to justify the adverse
employment decision was simply pretext to disguise intentional discrimination. See supra notes
24-27 and accompanying text. Such comments may also be relevant in a Teamsters-type case
of systemic disparate treatment when the plaintiff attempts to establish a pattern or practice of
discrimination. Similarly, O'Connor notes that such comments may be relevant in establishing
a case of harassment. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at -,
109 S. Ct. at 1804 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
60. See Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1119-20.
61. The district court disagrees believing that awareness "can be effective in eliminating
or minimizing stereotyping." Id. at 1120 n.15.
62. The D.C. Court of Appeals, in discussing the intent requirement, noted "[i]t is the
rare case indeed in which a group of sophisticated professionals . . . would formally pass on
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with a McDonnell Douglas/Burdine scheme with the plaintiff attempting to overcome the defendant's production of a legitimate,

the factfinder that the reanondiscriminatory reason by 6persuading
3
son advanced was pretextual.

III.
A.

DISPARATE IMPACT

Established Doctrine

It is undisputed that disparate treatment theory requires a find-

ing of discriminatory intent.6 4 When a disparate impact theory is applied, intentionality is not required.65 While disparate impact theory
is generally used to challenge employment practices disproportionately disadvantaging current minority employees or applicants, 66 the
Court has also recognized that disparate impact strikes at selection
practices which tend to deter qualified minorities from applying. 7
the candidacy of a woman or other member of a protected group in the unvarnished terms of
the Price Waterhouse partner who objected to all female candidates as a matter of principle."
Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 469. In the aftermath of Hopkins, professionals must be just a bit more
sophisticated and make certain no references to illegitimate factors appear in evaluation
materials. It would be impossible to eliminate gender references in evaluation materials sent to
individual partners since the partners must know the identity of the candidates in order to
evaluate them. Similarly, the Admissions Committee would also require identification of the
candidate since the members must sort, assemble, review and summarize the incoming evaluations from partners in order to make their recommendation to accept, reject or hold a candidate. The Policy Board need only review the summaries and recommendations of the Admissions Committee in making their decision to place a candidate's name on the partnership
ballot, deny the candidate partnership or place their candidacy on hold. As such, deletion of
the identity of the candidate and inclusion of only merit factors in the recommendations going
from the Admissions Committee to the Policy Board would reduce the firm's potential liability
for gender discrimination. As to the final vote by all the partners, identification of the candidate will again be required. See infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text (discussing Price
Waterhouse's selection process).
63. In the absence of tangible evidence of illegitimate factors, the plaintiff will be unable
to persuade the factfinder that an illegitimate factor more likely than not "motivated" or "substantially" influenced decision-makers at the time of their decision. As such, Hopkins mixedmotive scheme of litigation will be precluded under any and all of the theories of causation
advanced by the Court. See supra notes 5, 33, 34 & 37 and accompanying text (discussing
these theories of causation).
64. See generally supra notes 16-63 and accompanying text (discussing this in detail).
65. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (discussing the disparate impact challenge to height and weight requirements for correctional counselors); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (discussing the disparate impact challenge of use of
the revised Beta Examination of nonverbal intelligence and Wonderlic Test of verbal facility
for entry-level skilled positions); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (discussing
the disparate impact challenge to high school degree requirement and use of a standardized
intelligence test for employee transfers).
67. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 365-67; Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 417 n.6; see infra notes
115-19 (discussing the applications of the concept of deterrence practices in the context of
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In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,"8 eight members of the

Supreme Court 69 held that subjective or discretionary employment
practices 0 may, in appropriate cases, be challenged under a disparate impact theory. 71 The Court advanced two rationales for this extension. First, it avoids nullifying Griggs. Without the extension to
subjective practices, employers could insulate themselves from disparate impact liability by substituting subjective criteria for standardized criteria.7 1 Second, subjective criteria often give effect to subconpartnership decisions).
68. 487 U.S. 977 (1988). In Watson, plaintiff challenged a promotion scheme as racially
discriminatory. 798 F.2d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 1986). The dissent in the court of appeals found
that the promotion scheme lacked precise formal evaluation criteria and instead found that the
bank relied entirely on the subjective judgment of white supervisors acquainted with the candidates and the jobs to be filled. Id. at 805-06. Employees were given an aggregate rating by
supervisors based on twelve factors: accuracy of work, alertness, personal appearance, relations
with supervisors and co-workers, quantity of work, physical fitness, attendance, dependability,
stability, drive, friendliness and courtesy, and job knowledge. Id. at 812 n.26. Plaintiff's disparate treatment case was dismissed by the district court. See Watson, No. 4-81-581-E, slip op.
at 9, 14 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 1984). The District Court's judgment was affirmed by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Watson, 798 F.2d at 797. Plaintiff successfully argued that the
district court had erred in failing to apply disparate impact analysis to the subjective promotion scheme challenged. Watson, 487 U.S. at 989.
69. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision.
70. "Objective" is defined as "of or having to do with a known or perceived object, as
distinguished from something existing only in the mind of the subject, or person thinking."
WEBSTER'S NEw WORLD DICTIONARY 980 (2d Coll. ed. 1982). "Subjective" is defined
as "of,
affected by, or produced by the mind or a particular state of mind; of or resulting from the
feelings or temperament of the subject or the person thinking." Id. at 1418. Objective criteria
typically include examinations, education requirements, seniority, height and weight. Subjective criteria include nepotism, interviews and performance appraisals not based on hard data
such as quantifiable attendance. See EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.6(b)(1) (1987) (referring to subjective criteria as "informal or unscored" procedures).
71. 487 U.S. at 991. While this is the first case in which the Supreme Court has endorsed the use of disparate impact analysis in cases involving subjective evaluations, the Second, Third, Sixth, Tenth Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits have permitted such challenges. See, e.g., Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Hawkins v. Bounds, 752
F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1985); Segar v. Smith 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Zahorik v. Cornell
Univ., 729 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984); Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.
1983); Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 690 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1982). Traditionally, disparate impact theory has been reserved for challenged of standardized employment tests or criteria. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (wherein there were written tests); New
York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (wherein there was rule prohibiting
employment of drug addicts as subway drivers); Dothard,433 U.S. at 321-49 (wherein there
were height and weight requirements); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (wherein
there were written tests of verbal skills); Albermarle, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (wherein there were
written aptitude tests).
72. Watson, 487 U.S. at 989. The court also notes that selection systems containing both
subjective and objective criteria would generally be considered subjective and thus so long as
the employer included some subjective factors, they could avoid a disparate impact challenge
under Griggs. Id.
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scious stereotypes and prejudices.7
In Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,7 4 the Supreme Court

conclusively identified the scheme of litigation in a disparate impact
challenge.7 5 In their prima facie case, plaintiffs must "show that

there are statistical disparities in the employer's work force76 ...
and is responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employ-

ment practices that are already responsible for any observed statisti73. Id. at 990. Congress has also recognized this problem. In explaining the rationale
behind the expansion of EEOC enforcement power in the 1972 amendments to Title VII, the
House Report noted: "Employment discrimination, as we know today, is a far more complex
and pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject [now] generally describe the
problem in terms of 'systems' and 'effects' rather than simply intentional wrongs. . . . The
forms and incidents of discrimination which the Commission is required to treat are increasingly complex." HousE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS. 2137, 2144.
74. 109 S. Ct. at 2115 (1989). In Ward's Cove, plaintiffs, a class of nonwhite cannery
workers, brought a Title VII action alleging employer's "hiring/promotion practices . . . were
responsible for racial stratification of the workforce, and had denied them and other nonwhites
employment as noncannery workers on the basis of race." Id. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 2120. The
district court rejected all disparate treatment claims. 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 34, 437
(Nov. 4, 1983). The district court also rejected disparate impact claims on the ground they
were not subject to attack using a disparate impact theory. Id. at 31-33. The court of appeals,
following the Supreme Court's intervening ruling in Watson, reversed the district court ruling
disparate impact could be applied to subjective hiring practices. Ward's Cove, 810 F.2d 1477,
1482 (9th Cir. 1987).
75. Ward's Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2115-36. While Watson first identified the relative burdens of plaintiff and defendant in a disparate impact case, that part of the binding opinion
dealing with the relative burdens could only garner the support of a plurality of the Court. 487
U.S. at 982-1000. In Ward's Cove, a majority endorsed the Watson plurality's view. 109 S. Ct.
at 2118-27.
76. Ward's Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125. The determination of the required amount of statistical disparity is neither clear nor precise. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 994 (stating that the
"plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their
membership in a protected [class]."); see also Teal, 457 U.S. at 446 (stating that there should
be a "significantly discriminatory impact"); Beazer, 440 U.S. at 584 (stating that there should
be "statistical evidence showing that an employment practice has the effect of denying the
members of one race equal access to employment opportunities"); Dothard,433 U.S. at 329
(stating that there should be a "significantly discriminatory effect"); Washington, 426 U.S. at
246-47 (1976) (stating that there should be proof of "practices disqualifying substantially disproportionate numbers of blacks"); Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 425 (holding that the "tests in
question select applicants . . . in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of
applicants."); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426 (finding that the "requirements operate to disqualify
Negroes at a substantially higher rate than white applicants.").
For more specific guidance, courts have looked to the EEOC's four-fifth's rule, which
provides that if the selection rate for minorities is less than 80% of the selection rate for the
majority, discriminatory impact is inferred. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1987). Courts have
also considered a standard deviation analysis based on a binomial distribution analysis. See
Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308 n.14; Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 n.17 (1977).
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cal disparities."' 77 The Court believes plaintiffs have both the information7 8' and the statistical methodology 9 necessary to accomplish
their prima facie task. For the purpose of establishing plaintiff's
prima facie case, the Court has endorsed a number of statistical
comparisons: selection rate, 80 qualification rate81 and population
rate.82
77. Ward's Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2124 (citing Watson, 487 U.S. at 994). Plaintiff's duty'
to isolate and identify a specific practice relieves employers of the need to adopt prophylactic
quotas and preferential treatment as a cost-effective means of avoiding costly litigation defending innocent practices. Watson, 487 U.S. at 993. The majority in Ward's Cove notes that
plaintiff's duty to isolate and identify a specific practice is particularly acute where an employer combines subjective and objective rules and tests. 109 S. Ct. at 2125. But see Hopkins,
490 U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1803 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "[p]articularly
in the context of the professional world, where decisions are often made by collegial bodies on
the basis of largely subjective criteria, requiring the plaintiff to prove that any one factor was
the definitive cause of the decisionmakers' action may be tantamount to declaring Title VII
inapplicable to such decisions.").
78. See Ward's Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125. The EEOC's Uniform Guidelines required
employers to "maintain . . . records or other information which will disclose the impact which
its tests and other selection procedures have upon employment opportunities of persons by
identifiable race, sex, or ethnic group[s]". See Uniform Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(A)
(1987). Also included are records regarding "the individual components of the selection process" in cases of significant disparities in the selection rates of white and nonwhites. Id. at §
1607.4(C).
79. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) may be the best statistical technique designed to
study the influence of a number of continuous and discrete variables when the dependent variable is discrete (e.g. hired or not, discharged or not, promoted or not). See Fisher, Multiple
Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLJM. L. REV. 702 (1980). An ANOVA analysis determines the percentage influence of each independent variable (e.g. sex of candidate, race of
candidate, score on standardized measure, years of experience, educational attainment, etc.) on
the dependent variable (e.g. hired or not, discharged or not, promoted or not). When the outcome variable is continuous such as salary, multiple regression may be the preferable statistical technique. Id. at 702-03. In a regression analysis, the relationship between the dependent
or outcome variable (e.g. salary) and the independent variable (e.g., sex of candidate, race of
candidate, score on standardized measure, years of experience, educational attainment, etc.) is
determined by holding the other major independent variables constant. Id. at 706. The measure of the relationship is the regression coefficient of the independent variable. See Campbell,
Regression Analysis in Title VII Cases: Minimum Standards, Comparable Worth and Other
Issues Where Law and Statistics Meet, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1299 (1984); D. BALDUS & J. COLE,
STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980 & Supp. 1983).
80. This compares the percentages of minority and non-minority candidates selected
with the percentages available in the applicant pool. See Ward's Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2123
(stating that "if the selection rate of nonwhites is not significantly less than the percentage of
qualified nonwhite applicants, the selection mechanism probably does not operate with a disparate impact on nonwhites."). But see Teal, 457 U.S. at 450 (rejecting an employer's "bottomline" defense that, despite discrimination, the employer's workforce is balanced).
81. This compares the relative percentages of minorities and non-minorities in the relevant population possessing qualification(s). See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 321 (wherein 99% of
males and 59% of females meet height and weight requirements).
82. This compares the percentage of minorities in an employer's workforce vs. the percentage of qualified minorities in relevant population area. See Ward's Cove, 109 S. Ct. at
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If plaintiffs meet their prima facie proof burden, the case shifts
to the employer's business justifications for using the practice.8" Specifically, does the challenged practice significantly serve the legiti-

mate employment interests of the employer? 84 "In this phase, the
employer carries the burden of producing evidence of a business jus-

tification for his employment practice.

' 85

If the employer produces

2117 (endorsing use of population rate as usual basis for establishing prima facie case of disparate impact); Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308-09 (noting 1% minority teachers in employer's
workforce and 15% qualified teachers in county); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426 (wherein 12% of
blacks and 34% of white males in North Carolina had a high school diploma).
83. Courts have referred to this as justifying the practice as establishing "business necessity" or "job-relatedness." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. See Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 426.
"[T]here is no requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the
employer's business for it to pass muster." Id. at 436. Practices satisfy the standards of Title
VII if they "measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract." Id. Essentially,
the practice must measure the skills required for the job. As such, the practice bears a "manifest relationship to the employment in question" and constitutes a business necessity. Id. at
432.
Additionally, two other alternatives are available to employers in rebuttal. First, employers may attempt to show the plaintiff's statistical showing is misleading by attacking the sample as to size and/or composition, test chosen or geographic area. Employers may also present
their own statistical studies. See Ward's Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2121-27.
Second, employers may attempt to establish a statutory exception. See 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2 (1982) (excusing professionally developed employment tests and bona fide seniority or
merit systems despite any disparate impact they may cause). See Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324
(noting seniority systems); Albermarle, 422 U.S. 405 (noting there were professionally developed tests); Guardians Association v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980), affirmed on other grounds, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (discussing bona fide merit systems). See also §
1607.4(c) 29 C.F.R. (1987) (stating that discriminatory tests may be used if shown, by professionally acceptable methods, to be "predictive of or significantly correlated with important
elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated.").
The statutory defense of professionally developed tests is more stringent than establishing
the "job relatedness" of an objective test or criteria because professionally developed tests
must be formally validated. See generally Albermarle, 422 U.S. 405.
84. Ward's Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125; see also Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 425; Beazer, 440
U.S. at 587 n.31 (identifying "legitimate employment goals of safety and efficiency");
Dothard,433 U.S. at 331 n.14 (identifying "safe and efficient job performance" as legitimate
employment interest); Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 425 (stating that an employer has a legitimate
employment interest in "efficient and trustworthy workmanship.").
85. Ward's Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126. There must be a "reasoned review of the employer's justifications for his use of the challenged practice." Id. "A mere insubstantial justification . . . will not suffice". Id. This burden has been considered analogous, albeit unfavorably, to the rebuttal burden of production in "pretext" case of disparate treatment requiring
reasonably specific, objective evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for using the
challenged practice. See Watson, 487 U.S. 1000-05; see also supra notes 36 & 37 and accompanying text (discussing the rebuttal burden in a "pretext" case of disparate treatment).
Unless attempting to establish a statutory exception for a professionally developed employment test, there is no requirement that formal "validation studies" be conducted by the
employer. Watson, 487 U.S. at 998. The cost and difficulty of formally validating all the factors of a multi-factor scheme so as to avoid potentially catastrophic liability would encourage
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sufficient evidence to establish a business justification, the plaintiffs
have an opportunity to persuade the factfinder that there exist alternative practices which equally serve the employer's legitimate business interests with a lesser discriminatory effect. 86 The ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff.87
B.

Disparate Impact in PartnershipDecisions

The decision to admit an individual to a partnership often involves broad subjective and discretionary employment practices.88
The decision in Watson thus opens an entirely new avenue of attack
on promotions to partnership. While the district court in Hopkins
did not apply disparate impact principles to the promotion scheme
used by decision makers,89 the Admissions Committee and Policy
Board's recommendations were found to be wholly discretionary because they were "not controlled by fixed guidelines." 90 The district
court also found that the discretionary partnership selection process

used by Price Waterhouse "permitted negative comments tainted by
stereotyping to defeat Ms. Hopkins' candidacy." 91 It is likely that, in
employers' adoption of quotas and preferential treatment to preclude plaintiffs from establishing a prima facie statistical disparity. Id. at 991-94.
86. See Ward's Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-27; see also Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
Factors such as cost, inconvenience, unsuitability, etc. are relevant in determining equal effectiveness. See Ward's Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2127; Watson, 487 U.S. at 991-94.
87. See Ward's Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126; see also Watson, 487 U.S. at 997. The Court
wishes to avoid creating any incentive for employers to adopt any surreptitious quotas, Id. at
993. The dissent in Ward's Cove vehemently disagrees with this proposition, arguing that the
rebuttal burden on an employer in a disparate impact case is proof of an affirmative defense.
See Ward's Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Similarly, three Justices in
Watson, while concurring that disparate impact theory can be applied to subjective or discretionary employment practices, find the burden of persuasion as to business necessity on the
employer. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 1000 (Blackmun, J., with Brennan, J. and Marshall, J.
concurring).
88. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at , 109 S. Ct. at 1803 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
89. While Watson was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1988 and Hopkins in
1989, the district court decided Hopkins in 1985 at which time a disparate impact challenge
was not advanced nor applied. At the time of trial, there was a split among the circuits regarding the applicability of disparate impact theory to subjective evaluations. See supra note 71
(discussing this split). The district court did note his split. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1120
n.16. Since the district court did not apply disparate impact theory, it was not the subject of
appeal and neither the circuit court of appeals nor the U.S. Supreme Court discussed its application. See Hopkins, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
90. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1781. "A certain number of positive comments from partners will not guarantee a candidate's admission to the partnership, nor will a
specific quantity of negative comments necessarily defeat her application." Id. The Supreme
Court reaches this conclusion despite the district court's finding that negative comments are
often given great weight and "no" votes even from partners who may have only limited contact
with the candidate often result in a "no" or a "hold" decision. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1116.
91. 618 F. Supp. at 1118.
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future analogous cases, disparate impact challenges will be brought
as companion actions to disparate treatment challenges.92
1. Plaintiffs Prima Facie Case.-Often, two selections are
made in a decision to admit someone to a partnership: first, the nom-

ination of a candidate for partnership,93 second, the admission of the
candidate as a partner.9 4 A disparate impact plaintiff would likely

challenge both selection decisions through a proper statistical analysis of selection rates.95
Price Waterhouse is a national accounting firm.9 6 Candidate are
97
first identified and nominated by the partners in their local offices.
One cannot become a partner without first being selected as a candi-

date. Following nomination by partners in their local offices, nominating partners draft and distribute detailed recommendations" concerning the nominee to all of the firm's 662 partners who are invited
to submit evaluation forms, 99 an assessment of whether to accept,
92. The Supreme Court, in Teamsters, spoke obliquely on this issue stating "[e]ither
theory may, of course, be applied to a particular set of facts." 431 U.S. at 336 n.15. Some
circuits have permitted both theories to be used in the same action; in a class action suit,
plaintiffs usually claim both disparate treatment and disparate impact. See Segar v. Smith,
738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 115 (1985) (challenging Drug Enforcement Agency's promotion scheme is analyzed under both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories), Hayes v. Shelby-Memorial Hospital, 726 F.2d 1543 (1 1th Cir. 1984)
(discussing challenge to fetal vulnerability policy is analyzed under both disparate treatment
and disparate impact). The availability of a disparate impact challenge will be particularly
important because of the ease by which a partnership can eschew illegitimate stereotyping in
tangible evaluation materials. See supra notes 46-63 and accompanying text (discussing this in
detail).
93. This is the case in Hopkins in which partners in local offices nominate candidates for
partnership. 618 F. Supp. at 1111-12.
94. In Hopkins, following nomination by the partners in their local office, candidates
undergo an elaborate recommendation and review process. Id. at 1112. See also infra notes
97-103 and accompanying text (discussing the review process).
95. It is unclear whether these two decisions are merely sub-parts of a single decision to
admit a partner or whether they will be considered as two separate decisions. If the former is
the case, the plaintiff will simply isolate and identify the discretionary nomination process as
discriminatory during the prima facie case. The legal effect will be the same since the selection
rates for the two temporal moments will differ because the pools used for comparison will
differ. For a discussion of selection rate, see supra note 80 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of proper statistical pools, see infra notes 121-135 and accompanying text.
96. At the time of Ms. Hopkins' employment, Price Waterhouse was one of the "Big
Eight" accounting firms. The "Big Eight" have now, through merger, become the "Big Six".
Cowan, Changes in Accounting Leave Big Firms Strong, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1990, at D2, col.
5.
97. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1111-12.
98. It is important to note that these detailed recommendations are drafted after the
discretionary selection by local partners of a candidate from the pool of senior managers, Id. at
III1-12. Detailed recommendations are not drafted concerning those senior managers not proposed as candidates. Id. at 1112.
99. Id. at 1111-12. Partners who have significant and recent contact submit "long form"
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reject or hold the candidate 00 and a short comment explaining their
assessment.'
An Admissions Committee reviews all evaluation
materials, prepares a summary and makes a recommendation to accept, reject or hold the candidate to the Policy Board. 102 The Policy
Board then reviews the Admissions Committee's recommendations
and votes to include the candidate on the partnership ballot, reject or
hold the candidate. All partners ultimately vote to accept or reject
the candidates included on the partnership ballot.'
If brought as an impact case, Ms. Hopkins would have had to
isolate and identify specific discriminatory practices. 0 4 Hopkins
most likely would have been successful at isolating and identifying
two specific employment practices. One is the partner's written comments accompanying their numerical rankings along the 48 neutral
criteria. 0 5 Illegitimate stereotypes all appear in the written comments. 016 Two is the practice of leaving to local partners' discretion
the task of identifying and selecting persons for partnership candidacy. Unlike the decision to admit to partnership, the selection for
candidacy was wholly discretionary and lacking in any identifiable or
quantifiable components. 0 7 In such a case, courts may consider the
prima facie burden of isolation and identification satisfied. 08
evaluations, those with limited contact "short form" evaluations. Id. These forms ask the partners to rank the candidate in comparison to other recent partnership candidates in 48 different
categories. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. Illegitimate gender stereotypes appeared in these comments. See id. at 1116-19.
102. Id. at 1112. If the recommendation is to hold or reject the candidate, the Admissions Committee prepares a written statement of the reasons. Id.
103. Id. This vote follows the recommendations of the Admissions Committee and the
Policy Board. Id. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing isolation and
identification).
104. In Hopkins, practices included discretionary selection of candidates for partnership
by partners in the local offices, candidate's scores on 48 neutral items, written comments, partner recommendations, recommendation of Admissions Committee, and recommendations of
the Policy Board. 618 F. Supp. at 1111-12.
105. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1112.
106. Id. at 1116-19.
107. See id.at 1111-12. In order to nominate a candidate, partners in local offices "draft
written recommendations based on a detailed consideration of the candidates' qualifications."
Id. at 1112. It is wholly unclear whether there existed a specific, stable set of criteria to guide
the nominating partners selection and/or recommendation. Partners are not asked to rank candidates on the 48-category evaluations until after candidates are selected by partners in the
local offices. Id. Similarly, neither the Admissions Committee nor the Policy Board review the
qualifications of those senior managers not nominated. Id.
108. Strict enforcement of the identification requirement could provide employers with
an incentive to make their decision making process deliberately vague. In Watson, Justice
Blackmun recognized this danger and warned that the identification requirement cannot be
used "to shield from liability an employer whose selection process is so poorly defined that no
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While isolation and identification of a specific practice is a necessary element of Hopkins' prima facie case, it is not sufficient. Hopkins must also prove an identified practice caused a statistically significant disparity in employment opportunities between minority and
majority class candidates.10 9 It is unlikely that Hopkins could have
proven prima facie causation as to the decisions to place her candidacy on hold and deny her reconsideration. The district court identi-

fied females' selection rate for partnership at 60% and males' at
68 %.11° This would be statistically insignificant and unavailing to
Hopkins. 1 ' She would have failed to prove her prima facie case of

disparate impact." 2
Hopkins may have been successful at establishing causation as
to the selection of candidates for partnership." 3 There were 87 men
and one woman selected for candidacy in 1982."1 While no specific
numbers are available to determine the number of female or male
senior partners qualified for candidacy, the pool of qualified male
senior managers would had to have been approximately seventy
times the size of the pool of qualified female senior managers, in
order to preclude Hopkins from demonstrating a statistically signifi-

cant adverse impact." 5
specific criterion can be identified with any certainty, let alone be connected to the disparate
effect." 487 U.S. 1010 n.10. See Ward's Cove at 2132 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that an amicus brief filed on behalf of the employer recognizes that in some complex, multiple
factor selection rules it may be impossible to challenge each factor and the decision should be
challenged as a whole).
109. See supra notes 76, 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing causation and selection rates in a disparate impact case).
110. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1116. Presumably these rates reflect the relative percentages of male and female candidates nominated who actually are admitted as partners.
I 1. The female selection rate is at least 80% of the male selection rate and thus no
inference of discrimination arises. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1987) (describing how one
group selection rate must be within less than 80% of the predominant group selection rate).
112. While Hopkins fails to establish causation according to a disparate impact theory
because of the lack of sufficient statistical disparity, she may have established causation under
a disparate treatment theory. For a discussion of causation in a disparate treatment case, see
supra notes 5, 33, 34 & 37 and accompanying text.
113. This would require a percentage of the female senior managers selected for candidacy from the pool of female senior managers qualified for candidacy compared to the percentage of male senior managers selected for candidacy from the pool of male senior managers
qualified for candidacy. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1(B) & 1607.4(D) (1987).
114. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1112.
115. 29 C.F.R. § 1607-4(D) (1987). This would follow from the application of the fourfifth's rule. See supra note 76. If there were 100 female senior managers qualified for candidacy and one was selected, the female selection rate would be .01%. .01% is 80% of a .0 125
male selection rate. If 87 males were selected at a rate of .0125, the pool would have to
contain 6,960 male senior managers qualified for candidacy. Any less than 6,960 and the
firm's selection rates enter the domain of statistically significant adverse impact. Id.
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Defendant's Rebuttal.-If the plaintiff is successful at es-

tablishing a prima facie case,116 the firm will have two options in
rebuttal;11 7 first, attempt to discredit plaintiff's statistical showing, 118
second, produce evidence that its selection scheme is based on legitimate business interests." 9
If the defendant opts to discredit the plaintiff's statistics, chal-

lenges will center around the pool's plaintiffs used for statistical
comparison. 2 0 Attacks on statistical pools will generally take two
forms. One, the pool was not sufficiently large to permit a statistical
inference of discriminatory impact.' 2' Two, the pool was insufficiently refined because it contained persons unqualified for the em22
ployment opportunity.1
116. It is unlikely Ms. Hopk;ns could have successfully established her prima facie proof
of causation as to the decision to admit her to partnership. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (discussing this in detail). As such, no rebuttal by the defendant firm would be
necessary as to that selection. The following consideration of defendant's rebuttal burden concerning such a decision to admit a candidate presumes plaintiff is successful at establishing the
prima facie burdens of isolation, identification and causation. See supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text (discussing these burdens).
117. It is presumed partnerships will not attempt to avail themselves of their third option-the exception for professionally developed tests contained in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)
(1988).
118. Essentially the defendant would argue either that there is no disparity at all or that
the disparity is not the result of the identified practice. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 338-39
(stating that defendants "may endeavor to impeach the reliability of the statistical evidence,
they may offer rebutting evidence, or they may disparage in arguments or in briefs the probative weight which the plaintiff's evidence should be accorded."); see also infra notes 125-39
and accompanying text (discussing defendant's argument).
119. If successful, the firm will have established the "business necessity" or "job relatedness" of the selection scheme. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (discussing defendant's burden).
120. See generally Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339-41; Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 299.
121. The sample must be large enough to convince a court that any disparity is not due
to chance or inadvertence. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 571 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida,
430 U.S. at 494 n.13 (1974). The district court in Hopkins noted that because women have
only recently entered the accounting profession and partners have been selected over a long
span of years, plaintiff's attempt to show that the small number of women partners indicates
discrimination fails. 618 F. Supp. at 1116. In Teamsters, the company claimed that a low
turnover rate in the post-Act period may have accounted for persistent disparities between
minority and non-minority representation. 431 U.S. at 341.
122. In Hopkins the plaintiff had attempted to statistically show that the small number
of female partners at Price Waterhouse indicated discrimination. 618 F. Supp. at 1116. The
district court found that Hopkins did not present sufficient data on the number of qualified
women available for partnership. Id. In Hazelwood, plaintiff used general population data for
comparison with teachers in school board's workforce, and the Court found that "[w]hen special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population
• . .may have little probative value." 433 U.S. at 308 n.13; see also Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324
(stating that the use of general population data was permissible since the job skill involving the
ability to drive a truck is either possessed or readily acquired by most persons).
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As to the attack on pool size, if the plaintiff simply challenges
the decision to admit or not admit a nominated candidate, pools of
candidates are likely to be small.123 Even if the pool of candidates is
sufficient, the number of decisions to admit may be small. 24 While
the plaintiff may be able to show a statistical disparity, a defendant

will be able to destroy its probative value by demonstrating that the
pool is too small to permit a confident inference of causation.' 2 5 In

most partnerships, the defendant firm will likely prevail in shouldering its rebuttal burden of production as to decisions to admit persons
to partnership.' 26
The same may not be true of decisions to nominate persons for
admission to the partnership. In Hopkins, the District Court found

that partners are regularly drawn from the partnership's senior managers. 27 The labor pool of qualified persons for nomination would be
the pool of Price Waterhouse's senior managers.' 28 This pool will, by
definition, be larger than the pool of nominees and may be large
enough to constitute an adequate sample for statistical
comparisons. 29
123. The year Hopkins was nominated, eighty-eight candidates were proposed for partnership. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1112. Eighty-seven were male and one was female. Id.
124. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 71 (1984) (discussing that the
firm, at the time plaintiff was hired, was composed of more than fifty partners and approximately fifty associates). This may not be the case in large national accounting or legal partnerships. In Hopkins, there were 662 total partners at the time of the suit. 490 U.S. at __ , 109
S. Ct. at 1781. The year Hopkins was nominated, forty-seven candidates were admitted to
partnership. Id.
125. See Thomas v. Metroflight Inc., 814 F.2d 1506, 1509 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing authority that no spouse rules in practice result in discrimination against women; however a
disparate impact challenge failed because only plaintiff and one other person had been discharged under the rule); Fudge v. City of Providence Fire Dept., 766 F.2d 650, 658 (1st Cir.
1985) (holding that disparate impact in a single sample of individuals "may not justify the
conclusion that the test has a discriminatory impact upon the population as a whole."). See
generally D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980 & Supp.
1982) (discussing more thoroughly, specific statistical tests and their requisite sample sizes).
126. In Hopkins, the pool of female nominees was one who was not admitted. 490 U.S.
at -,
109 S. Ct. at 1781. The pool of male nominees was eighty-seven from which fortyseven were admitted. Id. While eighty-seven is a sufficiently large pool, one is not. Therefore,
while the male selection rate would be sufficient to permit comparisons, the female selection
rate would be insufficient to compare with it. A firm could avoid disparate impact challenges
by simply depressing the number of persons in one or both pools nominated each year.
127. 618 F. Supp. at II11.
128. It is unclear how many male and female senior managers there were at Price
Waterhouse. It is similarly unclear whether any other specified criteria existed for distinguishing senior managers qualified for nomination from senior managers unqualified for nomination
beyond the unbridled discretion of partners in the local offices. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the selection of a candidate); see also infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text (discussing the discretionary selection process).
129. In Hopkins, there were 662 partners. Although plaintiff presented no evidence as to
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The difficulty arises when we define the geographic scope of this
pool. A defendant may argue that since candidates are nominated by
local office partners from the senior managers working in that partner's local office, pools for determining selection rates should be local. 130 If local office selection rates are permitted, the number of selections may be too few to permit a confident statistical inference.
Even if local office rates are used, an alternative statistical comparison may be made. First, determine national male and female selection rates. Second, compare those national rates to the rates in each
local office.
As to the attack on pool composition, the Court in Ward's Cove
reiterates the principles established in Hazelwood requiring refined,
precise statistical pools in discrimination litigation. 131 Specifically,
"the racial composition of the qualified person in the labor market
and the persons holding at-issue jobs

. . .

generally forms the proper

basis for the initial inquiry in a disparate impact case."'1 32 The
proper labor pool of qualified persons for actual admission to the
partnership would be those persons proposed as candidates.1 3 The
proper pool of qualified persons for nomination as a candidate would
be the pool of senior managers. 34
If the defendant firm is unsuccessful at impeaching the plaintiff's statistical showing, it will attempt to justify the disproportionately disadvantageous selection practice identified by producing evidence that it is adequately job-related and constitutes a business
necessity.135 While "job-relatedness cannot always be established
the total number of senior managers, eighty-eight candidates were nominated. 490 U.S. at
109 S. Ct. at 1781.
130. It would be a substantial injustice for minorities to have an excellent chance of

-,

being selected as a partnership candidate in one part of the country and virtually no chance in
another part of the country.

131. The Court in Hazelwood required that the pool reflect persons possessing the skills
required for the employment opportunity; that the pool be limited to the geographic area in
which the employer recruits and hires and that the pool adequately distinguish pre-Act and
post-Act conduct. 433 U.S. at 1310.
132. Ward's Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2121. While the Court in Ward's Cove was considering

a challenge base on race, the same would be true of a challenge based on gender. Id. at 2118-

21. The majority does note that where such labor statistics are difficult or impossible to ascer-

tain, "the racial composition of otherwise-qualified applicants for at-issue jobs are equally probative." Id. at 2121.
133. For the purposes of this article, the author is ignoring the possibility of partners

from other firms being admitted as partners at Price Waterhouse and bypassing the elaborate
recommendation and review process.

134. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (discussing this in detail).
135. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (discussing business necessity and

job relatedness); Women Denied, supra note 10, at 262 (wherein a partnership's legitimate
employment interests have been identified as latitude to freely select new partners because the
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with mathematical certainty"' 13 and involves a case specific judg-

ment, courts generally require employers to show a rational connection between the selection process and job performance.13 7 Generally,
this connection is established through validation of the employer's
selection system.' 38
In the context of promotions to partnership, the plurality opin-

ion in Watson notes that "[i]t is self-evident that many jobs, for example those involving managerial responsibilities, require personal
qualities that have never been considered amendable to standardized
testing." "'

A lack of standardized testing generally presumes that

discretionary or subjective criteria will be used instead. In Watson,
there was substantial disagreement concerning the amenability of
subjective criteria and measures to validation, techniques. 40
The Watson plurality concludes that when defending subjective
relationship of co-ownership imposes joint and several liability for negligent acts of any partner
conducting ordinary partnership business). The district court in Hopkins recognized promoting
"cordial relations within a firm which is necessarily dependent on team effort" as a legitimate
employment interest. 618 F. Supp at 1116.
136. Watson, 387 U.S. at 994.
137. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (discussing this in detail).
138. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which tests were
validated). Formal validation is required for an employer to establish a statutory exception
under Title VII for a professionally developed test. See supra note 83 and accompanying text
(discussing Title VII). Formal validation studies are generally of three types: construct, criteria and content. Construct validation is the most abstract, most difficult and least used technique. It attempts to identify a psychological trait or characteristic (a construct) which is the
basis for successful job performance and then devises a selection procedure that measures the
presence and degree of that characteristic (e.g. leadership/firefighter; patience/teacher; ability
to endure boredom/typist). See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Criteria validation measures the relationship between scores on a test and the objective measures or criteria of job performance. Performance on the job must be determined by a detailed, objective
analysis which identifies objective criteria of the job (e.g. production rate, error rate, tardiness,
absenteeism, length of service). See, e.g., Albermarle, 422 U.S. 405, 425-30 (1975). Content
validation isolates significant representative samples of significant parts of the job itself and
utilizes that measure actual performance of these job components. This technique is generally
used when the job at-issue can be broken down into specific sub-tasks the performance of
which can be directly tested (e.g. typing tests, driving tests, shorthand tests). See, e.g., Gillespie v. Wisconsin, 771 F.2d 1035 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1083 (1986).
139. 487 U.S. at 990. This comment might be read as indicating that some occupations
so require subjective judgments that the use of subjective or discretionary criteria would be per
se valid. Id. The Government's brief stated that there is "no objective method for choosing law
firm partners, for selecting professors for tenure, or for appointing business managers." Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, at 16 n.13.
140. Compare Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at
17-25 (arguing that subjective selection methods cannot be successfully substantiated by formal means) with APA Brief at D4-D5 (asserting that subjective procedures can be validated if
they are systematically recorded). See Rose, Subjective Employment Practices:Does the Discriminatory Impact Analysis Apply?, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 63 (1988); Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REv. 945 (1982).
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tests or criteria, employers are not required to "introduce formal
'validation studies' showing that particular criteria predict actual onthe-job performance." 4 The plurality further notes that "in the
context of subjective or discretionary employment decisions, the employer will often find it easier than in the case of standardized tests
to produce evidence of a 'manifest relationship to the employment in
question.' "42

As to-the ease by which an employer can establish such a manifest relationship, there is a distinction to be drawn between subjective systems which identify a coherent list of subjective criteria and
wholly discretionary systems lacking any clear or stable criteria. The
system used by Price Waterhouse to select partners from the pool of
nominees is an example of the former, 143 and validation is possible.'4 While formal validation is not required, an employer may
have to produce at least some evidence that formal validation would
be unreasonably difficult, or prohibitively costly to justify not validating a subjective system shown to have an adverse impact. 14
The nominations of candidates by partners in their local offices
would be an example of the latter. 146 While partners in the local
offices when nominating candidates must draft "written recommendations based on detailed considerations of the candidates qualifications,' 47 it is wholly unclear whether each of the partners was considering the same or similar criteria or whether there was a stable
set of criteria at all. In such a case, there is "simply no way to determine whether the criteria actually considered were sufficiently related to the [firm's] legitimate interest . . . to justify a . . . system
with a . . . discriminatory impact.' 1 48 The EEOC's Guidelines express similar concerns.' 49 The concurrence in Watson counsels that
141. 487 U.S. at 990.
142. Id. at 991 (citing Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587 n.31).
143. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (discussing this selection system).

144. "[A] variety of methods are available for establishing the link between these [subjective] selection processes and job performance, just as they are for objective-selection devices." Watson, 387 U.S. at 1000. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
145. This would essentially limit the use of unvalidated subjective devices or criteria to
those circumstances where no viable alternative exists. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.(B) (1987).

146. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (discussing this selection system).
147. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1112.
148. Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 433 (emphasis in original).
149. "In view of the possibility of bias in subjective evaluations, supervisory rating techniques .
should be carefully developed. All criterion measures and the methods for gathering data need to be examined for freedom from factors which would unfairly alter scores of
members of any group." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14B(2) (1987). See also Bartholet, supra note 141,
at 1006-1008 (arguing for procedural reform of subjective systems including greater specification and weighting of criteria used so as to make them more amenable to professionally ac-
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"the bald assertion that a purely discretionary selection process al-

lowed [an employer] to discover the best people for the job, without
any further evidentiary support, would not be enough to prove jobrelatedness."' 50 Instead, the employer may have to produce evidence

and thus a
that an absence of specified criteria was job-related 151
wholly discretionary judgment was a business necessity.
C. Conclusion
In future cases, plaintiffs will use disparate impact to challenge

not only their rejection for admission as partners but the system used
to select them for candidacy. 152 The perception that one's chances to

become a candidate for partnership are tainted by discrimination is
equally as chilling as the perception that, if selected as a candidate,

one's chances for partnership are tainted by discrimination. Such
perceptions may tend to deter qualified minorities from applying or
remaining with the firm.' 53
It is in this respect that disparate impact has the most utility.
Disparate impact permits plaintiffs, themselves victims of disparate
treatment, to challenge phases or components of a system which do
not specifically victimize them. 54 Persons need not ignore a discrimicepted validation techniques).
150. 387 U.S. at 1000. (Blackmun, J., concurring). The concurrence goes on to note that
if an employer attempted to justify a system providing a hirer near-absolute discretion, the
employer would have to establish that the absence of specified criteria was necessary to the
proper functioning of the business. Id. at 1000 n.8. In Watson, bank supervisors were given
complete, unguided discretion in evaluating applicants for the promotions in question. Id. In
Hopkins, partners in the local offices were given similar unguided discretion to identity and
nominate candidates for partnership. 618 F. Supp. at 1111-12.
151. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.6(B) (1987) (stating that when "informal or unscored procedures" are used, the employer must either (1) amend the procedure to a more formal, scored
or quantified one and then validate it, or (2) "otherwise justify [its] continued use . . . in
accordance with Federal law."); see also Watson, 387 U.S. at 1000 n.8 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
152. Even though the ultimate selection rates were essentially equivalent (males at 68%;
females at 60%), this "bottom line" will not preclude a finding of liability if a specific component of the selection system is discriminatory. See supra note 80 (discussing the "bottom line"
defense). See generally Teal, 457 U.S. 440.
153. Indeed, the district court notes that "many potential women partners were hired
away from Price Waterhouse by clients and rival accounting firms." Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at
1116. This willingness of women qualified for candidacy to flee may be a consequence of their
perception of diminished opportunity for partnership (as of July 1984 only seven of the 662
partners at Price Waterhouse were women) or even candidacy for partnership (Hopkins was
the only woman among the 88 candidates for partnership in 1982). Id. at 1112.
154. A finding of liability in such a case would not necessarily entitle the plaintiff to any
remedy. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 324. In such cases, courts, in a subsequent remedy phase,
permit defendants to show that despite the disparate impact of the selection device or criteria
on the class of minority employees or applicants, the plaintiff was not directly its victim and
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natory phase or component of a promotion system because they fortunately escaped being its victim. Prima facie proof of adverse impact in one phase or component of a discretionary or subjective
promotion system will likely generate much suspicion of the promotion system as a whole. 155
IV.

RIPPLE EFFECTS

A. Affirmative Action
The dissent, in a footnote, presages the difficulty courts will
have applying Hopkins' new framework in the context of affirmative
action claims.156 In affirmative action cases, employment decisions
are explicitly premised upon a consideration of race or gender. Leaving aside arguments for and against affirmative action plans as a
matter of statutory interpretation or public policy 157 , the effect of
Hopkins on affirmative action burdens of proof may be substantial.
The framework of litigation in a challenge to an affirmative action plan "fits readily within the analytic framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas."1 58 The plaintiff is required to establish "a prima
facie case that race or sex has been taken into account in an employment decision."' 59 Once established, "the burden shifts to the emtherefore is not entitled to remedial relief in the form of reinstatement, backpay or retroactive
seniority. See id. at 360-62. Nevertheless, defendants may be required to eliminate the discriminatory system either by court order or because continuation of the practice exposes them
to liability to other plaintiffs. See id.
155. Traditionally, courts have been extremely suspicious of discretionary or subjective
selection practices because they allow expression of conscious or unconscious bias. See Watson,
487 U.S. at 989. If enough suspicion is generated, the plaintiff's burden of proving the existence of a lesser discriminatory alternative to the employer's system may be easier. See supra
note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the least restrictive alternative in disparate impact
litigation).
156. The dissent notes that while "[tihe plurality states that it disregards the special
context of affirmative action . . . [i]t is not clear that this is possible . . .[and] [i]f the structures of the burdens of proof in Title VII suits is to be consistent, today's decision suggests that
plaintiffs should no longer bear the burden of showing that affirmative action plans are illegal." Hopkins, 490 U.S. at -,
109 S. Ct. at 1813 n.4 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
157. See generally Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action
Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 78 (1986); Schatzki, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber: An
Exercise in UnderstandableIndecision, 56 WASH. L. REv. 51 (1980); Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination,41 U. Cm. L. REv. 721 (1974) (discussing such issues).
158. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626 (1987). While the McDonnell Douglas framework applies in Title VII challenges to affirmative action plans, such plans,
when adopted by public employers (state actors) may also be challenged under the Equal
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See id. In Equal Protection challenges, the state
actor must establish a compelling state interest and necessarily related means that are narrowly tailored in order to justify an affirmative action plan. See infra notes 164-65 (discussing
such challenges).
159. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626. In an affirmative action challenge, the plaintiff will be a
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ployer to articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision.
The existence of an affirmative action plan provides such as

rationale."' 1 0
Once these threshold showings are made, the litigation focuses

on justifications supporting the plan. If the justifications are sufficient, the plan is valid.'' If the justifications are insufficient, the
plan is invalid.'6 2 Justifications must support the plan at two levels.

First, does the history of the employer's treatment of minorities support the adoption of an affirmative action plan as a voluntary rem-

edy?16 3 Second, if the plan's adoption is justified, are its structural
components justified?6

white, a male or both. The defendant will be the employer adopting the preferential plan.
160. Id.
161. In such a case, the employer would prevail and the selection of the minority candidate would stand. See Johnson, 480 U.S. 616.
162. In such a case, the non-minority plaintiff would prevail. See id.
163. A majority of the Court has upheld affirmative action plans as justifiable remedies
for past discrimination resulting in "traditionally segregated job classifications". See Johnson,
480 U.S. at 616 (finding valid a plan adopted by a public employer giving women preference
in "traditionally segregated job classifications" challenged under Title VII); United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (finding valid under the Equal Protection Clause a plan requiring 50 % of Alabama state trooper promotions go to blacks due to Alabama's long-term, open
and pervasive discrimination); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding a setaside plan adopted by U.S. Congress reserving 10% of federal subcontracts for minorities
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause); United Steelworkers of Amer. v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979) (finding valid under Title VII a private employer's plan reserving 50% of the
slots in a training program for blacks because of traditionally segregated job classifications);
Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (finding the particular special admissions program unconstitutional, finding some remedial use of race constitutional for
the purpose of overcoming substantial, chronic minority underrepresentation in the medical
profession, and finding the particular special admission program unconstitutional); see also
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (finding the City's 30% set aside
plan invalid because discrimination was not a sufficiently compelling state interest and the plan
was not narrowly tailored); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding
invalid a provision in a collective bargaining agreement under which the Jackson Board of
Education extended preferential layoff protection to some minority employees); cf. Firefighters
Local Union Number 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (overturning a district court's injunction of a seniority system that, without the injunction, would decrease the proportional
representation of blacks in the department).
It is not required that an employer admit intentional discrimination nor an "arguable
violation" of Title VII in order to voluntarily adopt an affirmative action plan. See Wygant,
476 U.S. at 267. The prospect of liability accompanying such an admission acts as a disincentive to an employer's voluntary compliance with Title VII. See id. at 287-90 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (discussing a disincentive for public employers under Equal Protection); United
Steelworkers of Amer. v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 193, 211-16 (discussing a disincentive for employers under Title VII).
164. In Weber, the Supreme Court, while denying they were defining the "line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans," identifies a number of criteria to be considered in analyzing affirmative actions plans. 443 U.S. at 208. They
include: "the plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of white employees, does not
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In such a framework, the determination of which party has the

burden of persuasion as to the validity or invalidity of the plan becomes crucial. Specifically, must the defendant/employer persuade
the factfinder the plan is sufficiently justified and therefore valid; or
must the plaintiff/employee persuade the factfinder the plan is insufficiently justified and therefore invalid? Cases firmly establish that
the burden of persuasion is on the employee.1" 5 Hopkins has the potential to shift the burden of persuasion to the employer.16 Without
clearer guidance, Hopkins, strictly applied, invites a future in which
employers will find it more difficult to adopt voluntary affirmative
action programs.167
require the discharge of whites and their replacement with new black hirees, .... does [not]
create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees, . . . [and] is a temporary
measure . . . not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial
imbalance." Id. These elements have been applied in subsequent cases as defining elements of
permissible affirmative action plans. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 149 (finding Alabama's plan did
not impose an unacceptable burden on white promotion candidates because it was temporary
and did not require layoff or discharge of incumbent whites); Wygant, 467 U.S. at 267 (holding that preferential layoff protection of minority teachers in order to protect affirmative action
gains, trammel the rights of incumbent employees and maintain, not simply attain, racial
balance).
165. In the context of an Equal Protection challenge, the Court indicates that constitutional duties require "public employers to act with extraordinary care" in fashioning an affirmative action plan but the "ultimate burden remains with the employee to demonstrate the
unconstitutionality of an affirmative action program." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277. In the context
of a Title VII challenge, the Court stated, "reliance on an affirmative action plan is [not] to be
treated as an affirmative defense requiring the employer to carry the burden of proving the
validity of the plan. The burden of proving its invalidity remains on the plaintiff." Johnson,
480 U.S. at 267.
166. Hopkins has potentially the most impact in cases brought against both public and
private employers under Title VII. In Equal Protection challenges, constitutional principles
apply and the state actor (public employer) must establish a compelling state interest and
necessarily related means that are narrowly tailored in order to justify an affirmative action
plan. See supra note 164 (discussing such cases). While Equal Protection challenges will not
go untouched, the structure of constitutional litigation already imposes on the state actor voluntarily adopting an affirmative action plan a greater justificatory burden than that on an
employer under Title VII. The Court has stated "[tihe fact that a public employer must also
satisfy the Constitution does not negate the fact that the statutory prohibition with which the
employer must contend was not intended to extend as far as that of the Constitution." Johnson, 480 U.S. at 627 n.6. In a sense, if Hopkins is applied to cases of voluntary affirmative
action by private employers, the effect will be to bring the justificatory burden on the private
employer closer to the burden imposed on the public employer. A certain parallelism of burdens will be accomplished.
167. Such a reversal would be particularly ironic because the four Justices joining the
binding opinion: Brennan, Marshal, Blackmun and Stevens, have been defenders and crafters
of affirmative action. In Bakke, Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun concurred in that part of
the opinion establishing that some uses of racial preferences are permissible and reversing the
lower court's judgment prohibiting the University from establishing race-conscious programs
in the future. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. In Weber, Johnson and Paradisein which affirmative action plans were held valid, Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun voted with the majority.
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Application of Hopkins will potentially invalidate plans previously held valid. If the Hopkins framework were applied to the facts
in Johnson v. TransportationAgency,16 8 the decision would certainly

have come out differently. In that case, Mr. Johnson, a white male,
was originally promoted to the position of dispatcher. It was only

after the Affirmative Action Coordinator's intervention that Ms.

Joyce was substituted. 16 9 Mr. Johnson, in competition for the job,

received slightly higher interview evaluations 170 and had three years
greater seniority than Ms. Joyce. The district court determined that
"Johnson was more qualified for the dispatcher position than Joyce,
and that the sex of Joyce was the 'determining factor' in her
selection.''7

Under the Hopkins framework, a finding that sex was a "determining factor" would72 satisfy the requirement of "substantial" or
"motivating factor."' The testimony of the Affirmative Action Coordinator, the interviewers who recommended Mr. Johnson and the
Director of the Agency along with the interview scores and seniority

statistics would certainly be the sort of evidence required to invoke a
Hopkins framework. 173 Indeed, in the context of the Johnson case, it

can be said that Ms. Joyce's selection was "because of" sex.' 74

See 443 U.S. at 193; 480 U.S. at 616; 480 U.S. at 149. In Wygant, Stotts and City of Richmond in which affirmative action plans were held invalid, Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun
dissented. See 476 U.S. at 267; 467 U.S. at 561; 488 U.S. at 469. Stevens, one of the Justices
joining the plurality in Hopkins, has demonstrated a certain sympathy for affirmative action
voting with the majority in Weber, Johnson and Paradise and dissenting in Wygant and
Stotts. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 228. Yet Stevens concurred in Bakke and City of Richmond.
See 438 U.S. at 265; 488 U.S. at 469. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 164-67.
If Hopkins is strictly construed and broadly applied, the "liberal wing" of the Court will have
succeeded in eviscerating its own sacred cow.
168. 480 U.S. 616 (1987). In Johnson, plaintiff brought the challenge solely under Title
Vl1. Id. at 625. Since the Agency was a public employer it is possible that a similar challenge
could have been brought under Equal Protection. Plaintiff opted not to raise or address the
constitutional challenge in the litigation. Id.
169. This substituted decision was made pursuant to a voluntary affirmative action plan
adopted by the County in 1978. "IT]he Agency Plan provides that, in making promotions to
positions within a traditionally segregated job classification in which women have been significantly underrepresented, the Agency is authorized to consider as one factor the sex of the
qualified applicant." Johnson, 480 U.S. at 620-21. Johnson is similarly notable in that the
Court approved an extension of affirmative action beyond race to gender.
170. Mr. Johnson received a 75 and Ms. Joyce a 73 when interviewed by a two-person
board. Id. at 624.
171. Id. at 625.
172. It would satisfy this requirement under any and all of the characterizations of causation discussed in Hopkins. See supra notes 5, 33 & 34.
173. See supra notes 38-40 (discussing evidence needed to .shift a case to Hopkins'
framework).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2(a) (1988).
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It would have been impossible for the Agency to persuade the
factfinder they would have selected Ms. Joyce in the absence of the
plan in that they earlier rejected Ms. Joyce based solely on her merits.1 5 If a challenge to an affirmative action plan is premised on
facts substantially similar to those in Johnson, the non-minority
plaintiff would surely prevail and the interests of the beneficiaries of
affirmative action defeated. The application of Hopkins similarly
will not validate plans previously held invalid.1 6
Either affirmative action constitutes some sort of "special
case" 1 7 to which Hopkins will not apply or affirmative action is simply one type of individual disparate treatment challenge to which the
principles announced in Hopkins will apply. If the former is the
case, the Court will be forced to admit, without torturing legislative
history or statutory text,7 8 that when direct evidence shows an employer allowed race, sex, religion and national origin to work against
a minority applicant, a shift in the burden of persuasion to the employer is justified; while a similar evidentiary showing that an employer allowed race, sex, religion and national origin to work in favor
of a minority applicant and against a majority applicant will not justify a similar burden-shifting to the employer. 17 9
While the holdings of Hopkins arose from an employer's discrimination against a minority candidate for partnership, it is not
175. Hopkins requires the employer to prove they would have made the same decision in
the absence of the impermissible factor. 490 U.S. at _.
109 S. Ct. at 1795. Consideration

of the candidate's merits is all that would remain in the absence of the impermissible factor.
Id.
176. See supra notes 164-67 (discussing cases in which affirmative action plans were
invalid).

177. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at
178.

-

, 109 S.Ct. at 1784 n.3.

Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Weber took issue with the majority's interpreta-

tion of legislative history finding that:
the majority rejects a 'literal construction of § 703(a)' in favor of newly discovered
'legislative history', which leads it to a conclusion directly contrary to that compelled by the 'uncontradicted legislative history' unearthed in McDonald and other
prior decisions. Now we are told that the legislative history

ers are free to discriminate on the basis of race

. . .

. . .

shows that employ-

in favor of black employees in

order to eliminate 'racial imbalance'.

443 U.S. at 221. Similarly, Chief Justice Burger in his dissent was troubled by the majority's

interpretation of Title VlI's statutory language finding that "the [majority] seizes upon the
very clarity of the statute almost as a justification for evading the unavoidable impact of its
language. The [majority] blandly tells us that Congress could not really have meant what it
said, for a 'literal construction' would defeat the 'purpose' of the statute-at least the congres-

sional 'purpose* as five Justices divine it today." Id. at 217.

179. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at _
109 S. Ct. at 1788-90. The very existence of an affirmative action plan will constitute such direct evidence since such a plan explicitly provides for
preferential treatment on the basis of minority status and acts as an open admission. Id.
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inconceivable that in the future the converse might occur.' 8 0 A part-

nership may wish to adopt an affirmative action plan providing that
race, sex, religion or national origin be allowed to work in favor of a
candidate for partnership. If Hopkins is consistently applied, minority status may act neither as headwind nor tailwind.' 8 ' The "glass

ceiling"' 82 obstructing minority access to the highest levels of the
professions will not be removed by affirmative action. Under Hopkins, if minority status is among the factors considered by the decision maker at the time of making the decision, the employer will be
forced to persuade the factfinder they would have made the same

decision in the absence of the factor.'
B.

Retaliation Doctrine

84
Title VII creates a remedy for certain retaliatory conduct.
The framework of litigation in a retaliation case requires the plain180. A number of firms have adopted affirmative action plans designed to integrate
higher managerial levels. See Thomas, From Affirmative Action to Affirming Diversity, HARV.
Bus. REV. Mar-Apr 1990, at 107.
109 S. Ct. at 1787. Nothing in Hopkins indicates that minority
181. 490 U.S. at .,
membership may be used positively but not negatively. Similarly, minority stereotypes associated with affirmative action may constitute violations. Specifically, the stereotype that minorities can only achieve co-ownership or elevated status through some sort of preferential treatment unrelated to merit shall be impermissible. Therefore, in the light of Hopkins, Title VII
will neither tolerate overt nor covert manifestations of affirmative action.
182. See Women Denied, supra note 10, at 259-60 (discussing the "glass ceiling" metaphor which halts a women's career at a point where she can see the top but can't reach it).
183. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at -. , 109 S. Ct. at 1784-87. The plurality opinion seems
to hold that unless adequately disclaimed, any reference to race, gender, religion or national
origin poses a threat of liability. See id. Under this reasoning inquiries as to minority status
used to identify potential beneficiaries of affirmative action will be impermissible. The plurality
opinion, unlike the concurrences of O'Connor and White does not even explicitly require that
the reason be "substantial". Id.; see supra notes 5, 33 & 34 and accompanying text (discussing
these competing views of causation). Conceivably, even optional inquiries concerning race, gender, religion or national origin may provide the basis for a claim of discrimination. While preemployment inquiries regarding male/female status are permissible if made in good faith and
without a discriminatory purpose, any inquiry which directly or indirectly communicates any
limitation, specification or discrimination shall be unlawful unless based on a BFOQ. See
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (1989).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988) provides "it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment
* * , because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title,
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this [title]." An almost identical section is found in the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1985); see also Fed.
Reg. Empl. Serv. (Law Co-op), §§ 31:1-34:66 (1976) (discussing Fair Labor Standards Act
anti-retaliation provisions that may be applied under the Equal Pay Act). Two types of employee conduct will be protected from retaliatory action: "opposition" to ongoing unlawful conduct by the employer and an employee's "free access" to dispute resolution mechanisms,
whether agency, judicial or otherwise.
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tiff to prove a prima facie case based on opposition to an unlawful
employment practice.'8 5 "The plaintiff meets this burden by establishing that: (1) she was engaged in statutorily protected expression,
viz., opposition to a seemingly unlawful employment practice;188 (2)
she suffered an adverse employment action; and, (3) there was a
causal connection between the statutorily protected expression and
the adverse employment action."'1 8 7

If plaintiff is successful at establishing the prima facie case, the
employer must produce evidence of a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason" for the adverse employment action. 88 Not all employee opposition will be protected. Opposition conduct must be reasonable
under the circumstances. 8 9 Unreasonable opposition conduct may
185. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53. While "opposition" cases will often focus on the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the employee's opposition conduct, in "free access"
cases, the protection of Title VII is nearly absolute. See East v. Romine Inc., 518 F.2d 332
(5th Cir. 1975) (striking employer retaliation based on employee's "litigious" nature in filing
several previous charges); Barela v. United Nuclear Corp., 462 F.2d 149 (10th Cir. 1972)
(deciding that employer retaliation based on the likelihood that employee will be nonpermanent due to a pending charge seeking reinstatement with a former employer is struck down);
Stebbins v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., No. 373-99-A (E.D. Va.), affd. on other grounds,
469 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1972) (deciding that employer retaliation based on a loss of essential
confidence in the employer/employee relationship because of an unfounded charge is struck
down); EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd., 559 F.2d
1203 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 4334 U.S. 920 (1977) (striking employer retaliation based
on the employee's request of information relevant to a charge against an employer from one of
the employer's customers).
186. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to be correct that the employer is violating Title
VII. A reasonable, good faith belief of a violation will be sufficient. See Berg. v. La Crosse
Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041, 1045-46 (7th Cir. 1980); Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588
F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978).
187. Jennings v. Tinley Park Community Consol. School Dist., 864 F.2d 1368, 1371
(7th Cir. 1988) (holding that when secretaries bypassed the superintendent and presented an
alternative pay schedule to that proposed by the superintendent directly to the school board,
the superintendent only discharged his secretary, and offered as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason loss of "trust and confidence" caused by her bypass). Id. at 1369-71; see also
EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 1983); Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale and Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1136 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1000 (1982).
188. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Crown
Zellerbach, 720 F.2d at 1012. Disciplining an employee for the employee's opposition to an
apparent unlawful employment practice would not be such a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason. Jennings, 864 F.2d at 1372.
189. A critical element in determining the reasonableness of the opposition conduct is
the extent the conduct disrupts the employer's operations. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 792 (wherein illegal acts were held to be an unreasonable form of opposition); Hochstadt v.
Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 229-34 (Ist Cir. 1976) (wherein
conduct which was hostile and disruptive to other employees' morale and work performance
was held to be unreasonable opposition). Contra Crown Zellerbach, 720 F.2d at 1013 (writing
letters to a corporate parent and/or a contractual party expressing a belief of employer's noncompliance with Executive Order 11246 held to be a reasonable form of opposition).
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*"exceed the cloak of statutory protection" and will constitute a legit-

imate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. 9 '

If the employer carries the rebuttal burden, the plaintiff has the
opportunity to prove the employer's articulated reason was merely
pretext disguising the employer's actual discriminatory motive.' In
proving pretext, the plaintiff essentially will reestablish the reasona-

bleness of the opposition conduct. 192 At the close of evidence, the
trier of fact makes the factual finding of the presence or absence of

unlawful retaliation. It is without dispute that, under the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine scheme of litigation the burden of persuasion re-

mains with the plaintiff at all times.' 93
Since the framework of retaliation litigation follows McDonnell
Douglas and Burdine, Hopkins potentially applies in cases of retalia-

tion. Since a causal connection between the expression and the adverse employment action is an element of plaintiff's prima facie

case,'1 4 Hopkins' principles should apply whenever plaintiffs establish their prima facie case. 195 If a retaliation case is shifted to a
Hopkins scheme, the rebuttal burden on the employer will become
one of persuasion and not simply production of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. The consequence of such a burden shift will be to provide employees with
conduct 9 ' and should further the
greater protection from retaliatory
197

remedial goals of Title VII.

190. Jennings, 864 F.2d at 1374.
191. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Jennings, 864
F.2d at 1372.
192. In Jennings, pretext would require evidence that the employer was likely to disrupt
or prevent legitimate opposition. 864 F.2d at 1373.
193. Insofar as a retaliation case follows the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine scheme of
litigation, the burden of persuasion is carried by the plaintiff. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (noting this burden).
194. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
195. This is particularly true under the plurality opinion's definition of causation. See
supra notes 5 & 33 and accompanying text. Under Justice O'Connor's concurrence, there may
be a question whether the causal connection is "substantial." See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
196. In the future, victims may more confidently remain in their positions and attempt,
through reasonable opposition conduct, to influence the dominant discriminatory workplace
without fear of retaliation. While persons may not be able to prevent or prove discrimination,
they will not be obliged to be silent victims for fear of losing their current positions.
197. The Court has identified Title VII's remedial goals as achieving equality of employment opportunities, the removal of barriers that, in the past, have operated in favor of nonminority employees and applicants. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429. In Albermarle, the Court
identified the remedial goal of "caus[ing] employers and unions to self-examine and to selfevaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last
vestiges" of their discriminatory practices. 422 U.S. at 417-18. It is particularly important to
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Two scenarios exist for plaintiffs to establish a claim of retaliation. In the first scenario, the employer admits the retaliation and
seeks to justify it.' 98 In future retaliation cases, such an admission
will certainly constitute the sort of evidence required to shift the case
from a Burdine framework to a Hopkins framework. 199 In the face
of such an admission, litigation will turn on the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the opposition conduct.2 00 If Hopkins applies in
cases of employer's admissions of retaliation, the employer, in rebuttal, will be required to persuade the factfinder that the plaintiff's
opposition conduct was unreasonable under the circumstances. 20 1 No
longer will the plaintiff be required, in surrebuttal, to persuade the
factfinder of the reasonableness of the opposition conduct.
In the second scenario, the employer makes no admission of retaliation yet the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case.20 2 In such
cases, the employer will be required to persuade the factfinder that,
in the absence of the opposition conduct, the employer would have
made the same decision.203 In the case of an employee with a satissuch self-examination and self-evaluation to permit opposition conduct to perceived
discrimination based on stereotypes. The weight given to discriminatory stereotypes is often
not consciously intentional and can only be minimized or eliminated by making persons aware
of their
stereotypes. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. One cannot attack
stereotypes
without first exposing them to the person indulging them. It will be more effective
to expose
them informally in the workplace through reasonable opposition conduct rather
than being
forced to formally expose them during litigation in the courts.
198. In Jennings, the superintendent admitted the retaliation. See supra note 188
and
accompanying text. Similarly, in McDonnell Douglas the employer admitted retaliation.
411
U.S. at 796. Employer had refused to rehire Green because of his civil rights activities
which
took the form of deliberate and unlawful "stall-ins" and "lock-ins". Id.
199. See supra notes 38-40 (discussing the type of evidence required to invoke
a Hopkins framework).
200. In Jennings, certain findings of fact were made. Mutual trust and confidence
were
essential to the proper functioning of the workplace, 864 F.2d at 1375. Jennings told
the superintendent she did not trust him to deliver the salary to the board. Id. Jennings' belief
that the
superintendent would not deliver the pay schedule to the School Board was unreasonable,
Id.
at 1376. Pay schedule was not delivered to the superintendent prior to delivery to
the School
Board. Id. Superintendent discharged Jennings because of the form of her protest.
Id. Jennings' discharge was based on a loss of trust and confidence by the superintendent
which was
reasonable under the circumstances. Id. It was thus determined that the employer
was not
liable for retaliatory discriminaiton. Id.
201. This follows from the particularized scheme of litigation in retaliation cases
in
which the employer admits the retaliation and seeks to justify it. Id.
202. Other circumstances less "direct" than an employer's admission of the casual
nexus
between the opposition and the adverse employment action may also be considered
sufficient
evidence to shift the case to a Hopkins scheme. Such circumstances may include the
temporal
proximity of the adverse action to the opposition conduct, statistical evidence of
a pattern, or
practice of employer retaliation and testimonial evidence.
203. This follows from the general scheme of litigation in cases of individual disparate
treatment applied to the specific context of retaliation cases. Such reasons would
include work
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factory work record, the employer may find it exceedingly difficult to
persuade the factfinder that anything other than retaliation motivated the adverse employment action.2"4
In Hopkins, Ms. Hopkins challenged two adverse employment

decisions; first, the decision of the Policy Board to place her candidacy on hold,2 0 5 second, the decision of the Policy Board not to re-

propose her for partnership.20 6 Both decisions were challenged as re20 7 Had
lated components of a pretext case of disparate treatment.

the principles of Hopkins been announced in an earlier case, the decision not to re-propose her would likely have been alleged as a separate discriminatory act of retaliation.208 Ms. Hopkins might have
prevailed on the retaliation claim without prevailing on the claim
that Price Waterhouse intentionally discriminated against her in re-

jecting her for partnership.209

The district court found that, following the decision to place her

on hold, Ms. Hopkins underwent a Quality Control Review in order
to improve her chances for partnership the following year.210 She received favorable results.21 ' At the same time, Ms. Hopkins received
performance so unsatisfactory as to justify the adverse employment action, decline in business
sufficient to justify hour reductions, layoffs or terminations, or any other legitimate reason
unrelated to the plaintiff's opposition conduct.
204. Shifting the burden of persuasion to the employer virtually guarantees that, in
cases in which the reasonableness/unreasonableness of the employee's opposition conduct is at
issue, a close case will be resolved in favor of the plaintiff/employee.
205. Price Waterhouse never disputed that Ms. Hopkins was qualified for partnership
and conceded that, but for the complaints about her interpersonal skills, her candidacy would
probably have been successful. 618 F. Supp. at 1113. The Policy Board, in reaching the initial
decision to place her candidacy on hold, adopted the recommendation of the Admissions Committee stating "she should be held at least a year to afford time to demonstrate that she has
the personal and leadership qualities required of a partner." Id. at 1113.
206. After this decision, Ms. Hopkins was informed it was highly unlikely she would be
admitted to partnership. Id. at 1113. Ms. Hopkins then resigned. Id.
207. Id; compare notes 16-30 supra, and accompanying text with notes 31-45, supra,
and accompanying text (discussing the differences between pretext and mixed motive cases).
208. Hopkins had originally alleged both harassment and retaliation but both allegations
were dropped before trial. 618 F. Supp. at 1121. While solely a matter of speculation since the
issue was never litigated as a retaliation claim, Ms. Hopkins' rejection for reproposal may have
been caused by disappointment at being rejected coupled with her good faith belief that the
placing of her candidacy on hold was the product of discrimination. This disappointment may
have made her otherwise marginal interpersonal skills intolerable to her senior partners.
209. It is not necessary that the employer have actually violated Title ViI in the first
adverse employment decision to predicate a finding of illegal retaliation in the second adverse
employment decision. A victim's good faith belief of a Title VII violation is all that is necessary to bring opposition conduct under the protection of Title VII. See supra note 186 and
accompanying text.
210. 618 F. Supp. at 1113.
211. Id. The Policy Board's decision not to re-propose her the next year was made
before the favorable results of this review were submitted and considered. Id.
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assurances from several partners that she would be provided "opportunities to demonstrate her abilities and receive more exposure" in
hopes of a subsequent successful partnership bid.212 These opportunities never materialized. 1 3 Instead, the Policy Board decided not to
re-propose her for partnership only four months following her

rejection. 1 4

The district court found the decision not to re-propose Ms. Hopkins for partnership was the result of two partners in her office
changing their position.21 5 One partner had earlier voted to put her
candidacy on hold.2" 6 The other partner had earlier supported her
candidacy.2u Both partners emphasized that concern over Ms. Hopkins' interpersonal skills motivated their change of position. 21 8
The district court found Ms. Hopkins had failed to satisfy her
burden of proving the partners' explanations of their change of position were pretextual2 1 Consequently, the Policy Board's decision
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1115.
214. Id. at 1113. The temporal contiguity of the Board's initial rejection of Ms. Hopkins
for partnership and their subsequent decision not to re-propose her for partnership coupled
with broken assurances of opportunities'for improvement and dearth of investigation of current
relationships with staff would likely be sufficient to establish the causal connection necessary
in
a plaintiffs prima facie case of retaliation.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1114. Among the reasons offered for his later opposition to reproposal was
because he "found her disagreeable to work with and had reservations about her ... dedication to the firm." Id. Lack of dedication in this context cannot refer to an unwillingness
to
work hard. Ms. Hopkins "played a key role" in successfully winning a multi-million dollar
contract with the State Department, "had no difficulty [working] with clients ... [who]
appear to have been very pleased with her work" and "was generally viewed as a highly competent project leader who worked long hours." Id. at 1112-13. "None of the other partnership
candidates . . . that year had comparable record in . . . securing major contracts." Id.
at
1112. More likely it refers to a loss of trust and confidence. Loss of trust and confidence are
often asserted as justifying retaliatory action. See supra notes 186, 188 and accompanying
text.
217. Id. at 1114. He changed his mind after conversing with Ms. Hopkins several times,
receiving additional staff criticism of her management style and further evaluating his previous
experience with her work. Id.
218. Id. In Hopkins, the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason advanced by the employer
for placing Ms. Hopkins' candidacy on hold was that she was abrasive and aggressive. Id.
at
1113. The partners simply reiterated this reason as motivating their change of position. Id.
at
11 i4-15. In the interim four months between placing her candidacy on hold and denying
her
reconsideration, "no one made any effort to check on the plaintiff's current relationship with
staff members.
... Id. at 1115.
219. Id. If Ms. Hopkins had made her prima facie case of retaliation, she would not
have the burden of proving pretext. Instead, Price Waterhouse would have the burden of
persuading the factfinder that the partner's changed their position in response to something other
than opposition conduct. Price Waterhouse may have been forced to persuade a factfinder that
her interpersonal skills had become suddenly unacceptable as a result of disappointment
at
rejection and not simply because she had become engaged in protected expression of opposition
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not to re-propose her was not discriminatory. 2 0 Having reached this
finding, the district court held that Ms. Hopkins had failed to prove

she had been constructively discharged221 and denied her appropriate
relief. 222 Specifically, the district court declined to award her

backpay for the period subsequent to her resignation and declined to
223
order the firm to make her a partner. Had Ms. Hopkins prevailed

on a retaliation claim, she would have been entitled to a226backpay
225 and re-proposal for partnership.
award, 224 reinstatement
Ms. Hopkins did not require a retaliation claim to vindicate her

interest. She was vindicated by her successful claim of discriminatory treatment against Price Waterhouse. Future plaintiffs in 6hallenges to partnership decisions, mistaken in their good faith belief
and vocal opposition of discriminatory treatment, might not be similarly vindicated. For such persons, the greater protection from retali-

ation provided by Hopkins may be important in two ways. First, if
to perceived discriminatory treatment. Since no one had checked on her staff relationships
between the first and the second decision, no one could have made the determination that her
interpersonal skills had worsened during the gap period.
220. Id. at 1115. If retaliation had been alleged, Hopkins needn't have proven discrimination. Rather, she would have had to prove retaliation. In a retaliation case, the surrounding
circumstances of the partners' change of position would be relevant.
221. Id. at 1121. Even though the district court held her rejection was tainted by illegal
stereotyping, "the fact that discrimination has occurred does not, by itself, provide the 'aggravating factors' required to prove a constructive discharge." Id. The court of appeals, while
agreeing with the district court that the mere fact of discrimination will not, without more,
establish constructive discharge, did find that Ms. Hopkins' rejection coupled with the failure
to renominate her, constituted a career-ending action and amounted to a constructive discharge. 825 F.2d at 472-73.
222. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1121.
223. Id. at 1120-21. The court of appeals disagreed with the district court's refusal and
remanded for a determination of appropriate damages and relief. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 473.
109 S. Ct. at 1775. On
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. 490 U.S. at -,
remand, the district court ordered that Ms. Hopkins be made a partner effective July 1, 1990,
partnership shares equivalent to the average compensation given to management consulting
partners admitted on July 1, 1983, backpay in the sum of $371,175, attorney's fees in the sum
of $422,460.32 and enjoined Price Waterhouse from retaliating against Ms. Hopkins. See 737
F. Supp. at 1216-17.
224. The district court held Hopkins was entitled to backpay from the date of the first
decision until her decision to resign seven months later. 618 F. Supp. at 1121. Had retaliation
been found to generate a constructive discharge, Hopkins would be entitled to backpay from
the date of her resignation to the date of her reinstatement. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 473.
225. Because the district court found Hopkins had voluntarily resigned and had not been
constructively discharged, reinstatement was not ordered. 618 F. Supp. at 1121. Had Hopkins
prevailed on the retaliation claim, even without a concurrent judgment of employer liability on
the first disparate treatment claim, Hopkins would have been reinstated in order that her candidacy could be reproposed the following year.
226. It is likely the court would order Price Waterhouse to reconsider Hopkins for partnership the following year as promised.
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the person chooses to remain in the employ of the partnership and is,
at a later date, considered for partnership again, the threat of further opposition conduct or legal challenge in the event of a second

rejection may motivate decision-makers to accept the candidate. Second, employers may be more reluctant to make a follow-up decision
not to re-propose the candidate for partnership for fear it will appear
retaliatory.
C. Protection For Homosexuals

Judicially, it is a settled issue that Title VII offers no protection
to homosexuals227 or transsexuals22 8 from discrimination in employment. Legislatively, efforts to amend Title VII to protect sexual preference have consistently failed.229 Under the current state of affairs,
homosexuals must take care to conceal their homosexuality. Its exposure will render them vulnerable to discrimination without legal recourse. 230 An employer is free to reject, terminate or refuse to promote homosexuals simply because they are a homosexual.231
227. See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th
Cir. 1979);
Macauley v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 397
N.E.2d 670 (Mass.
1979). Cf. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 325-27 (5th Cir.
1978). The EEOC
itself has ruled that adverse action against homosexuals is not cognizable
under Title VII.
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 6495 (1983).
228. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 1984)
(rejecting
a claim that discrimination against transsexuals constitutes sex discrimination),
cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1017 (1985); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659,
661-62 (9th Cir.
1977). Two district courts have held that Title VII does not protect transsexuals.
Powell v.
Read's Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369 (N.D. Md. 1977); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies
Medical Center,
403 F. Supp. 456, 456-57 (N.D. Cal. 1975), affd., without published opinion,
570 F.2d 354
(9th Cir. 1978).
229. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1981: Hearings on H.R.
1454 Before
the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunitiesof the House Comm. on Education
and Labor,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1982); Civil Rights Act of 1979: Hearing on H.R.
2074 Before the
Subcomm. on Employment Opportunitiesof the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1980).
230. Sexual preference discrimination has been the subject of a number of
articles. See
Note, Challenging Sexual Preference Discriminationin Private Employment,
41 OHIo ST. L.
J. 501 (1980) (authored by Donna L. Wise); Friedman, Constitutional and
Statutory Challenges to Discriminationin Employment Based on Sexual Orientation, 64
IOWA L. REV. 527
(1979); Siniscalco, Homosexual Discrimination in Employment, 16 SANTA
CLARA L. REV.
495 (1976). Similarly, discrimination against transsexuals has also been
discussed. See Note,
Denial of Title VII Protection to, Transsexuals: Ulane v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 34 DEPAUL
L. REV. 553 (1985) (authored by David M. Neff); Green, Spelling "Relief'for
Transsexuals:
Employment Discriminationand the Criteriaof Sex, IV YALE L. & POL'Y.
REV. 125 (1985).
231. A number of governmental entities have prohibited discrimination
in employment
on the basis of sexual preference. See, e.g., WXIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31-.395
(West 1988).
Some states have executive orders banning some forms of sexual orientation
discrimination in
state employment. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 4, § 28
(1983). Cities and
counties have enacted forms of anti-discrimination provisions: Tucson (Arizona);
Berkeley,
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Title VII prohibits "employment decisions . . . predicated on
mere 'stereotyped' impressions about the characteristics of males and

females. ' 32 In Hopkins, a plurality of the Court held that "[i]n the
specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must
not be, has acted on the basis of gender. 2 13 3 This is a significant
extension of the scope of sex stereotyping moving from a inter-class

view emphasizing "habitual assumptions about a woman's ability to
perform certain kinds of work,"2 34 to a view recognizing intra-class
sex stereotyping. 35
In the aftermath of Hopkins, an alarming inconsistency remains. Several courts of appeals have held that effeminacy is a permissible basis for refusing to hire a male applicant.2 36 To permit emCupertino, Davis, Laguna Beach, Los Angeles, Mountain View, Oakland, Sacramento, San
Francisco, San Jose, Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz and West Hollywood (California); Aspen and
Boulder (Colorado); Hartford (Connecticut); District of Columbia; Atlanta (Georgia); Honolulu (Hawaii); Champaign, Chicago, Evanston and Urbana (Illinois); Iowa City (Iowa); Baltimore and Montgomery County (Maryland); Amherst, Boston, and Malden (Massachusetts);
Ann Arbor, Detroit, East Lansing, Ingham County, Lansing and Saginaw (Michigan); Hennepin County, Minneapolis and Mankato (Minnesota); Alfred, Buffalo, Ithaca, New York City,
Rochester and Troy (New York); Chapel Hill, Durham and Raleigh (North Carolina); Columbus, Cuyahoga and Yellow Springs (Ohio); Portland (Oregon); Harrisburg and Philadelphia (Pennsylvania), Austin (Texas); Clallam County, King County, Olympia, Pullman, and
Seattle (Washington); Dane County, Madison, and Milwaukee (Wisconsin). See Letter from
Paula L. Ettelbrick, Legal Director, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., to
Anne Seidel (Mar. 7, 1989) noted in Developments-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1584, 1668 n.51 (1989). On the same day in the same city as DeSantis was
handed down, the Supreme Court of California held that homosexuals could sue a public utility for employment discrimination under the California Constitution. See Gay Law Students
Ass'n. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458 (1979).
232. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978); see
also Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (stating that "[i]n
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting
from sex stereotypes."). Both of these were challenges to facially discriminatory distinctions
between men and women. In Manhart, contributions to a pension fund were at issue. 435 U.S.
at 702. In Sprogis, a distinction between males and females as to marital status was struck
down. 444 F.2d at 1194.
233. Hopkins, 49 U.S. at - , 109 S. Ct. at 1790-91. The Court found that employment decisions based on such stereotypes constituted discrimination because of sex. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988).
234. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707.
235. Instead of drawing stereotypical distinctions between the class females with those
concerning the class males, intra-class stereotyping focuses on stereotypes within the class
females.
236. See Smith v. Liberty Mutual Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding that Title
VII was not violated when the employer refused to hire applicant on ground that applicant
appeared to be effeminate); see also DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th
Cir. 1979).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

41

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 2
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 8:1

ployers to penalize effeminate men for behavior and attitudes
acceptable for female workers while prohibiting a similar penalty of
aggressive women for behavior and attitudes acceptable for male
workers offends even the most callous sense of justice. To reject, discharge or refuse to promote a man because he conforms to a feminine stereotype is not analytically distinguishable from rejecting, discharging or refusing to promote a woman because she conforms to a
masculine stereotype.237
It is interesting to note that within the context of sex stereotyping, when courts have addressed the issue of effeminacy under Title
VII, they have included homosexuality as its analytic companion. In
DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., the court felt it
necessary when considering effeminacy to also consider homosexuality and transsexuality finding all three of them outside the purview
of Title VII. 288 In Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the plaintiff "established that Liberty Mutual failed to hire him because he
was classified as effeminate 239 and that the interviewer didn't like
this particular person . . . because he . . . gave evidence of the

characteristics of sexual aberration. 24 °
It is conceivable that employers covertly or overtly use effeminacy in men and aggressiveness in women as stereotypical proxies for
homosexuality. 241 For such an employer, the effect of Hopkins will
be significant. While employers will remain free to reject, dismiss or
refuse to promote homosexuals, the ability of the employer to reject,
dismiss or refuse to promote effeminate men or aggressive women
because of a cultural stereotype equating effeminacy and aggressiveness with homosexuality may no longer be so easily indulged.242
237.

The Court in Hopkins does not directly discuss its application in cases of discrimi-

nation based on effeminacy. Presumably, when this issue is raised, the Court will similarly

prohibit intra-class sex stereotyping of men.
238. DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 332 (stating that discrimination because of effeminacy, like
discrimination because of homosexuality or transsexualism, does not fall within the purview of
Title VIl.)
239. Smith, 569 F.2d at 328.
240. Id. at 328 n.4. Presumably, this "sexual aberration" is homosexuality.
241. This merely represents a second-order sexual stereotype. First, we have the stereotype that men shouldn't act like women and women shouldn't act like men. Second, we have
the stereotype that if men do act like women and women do act like men they are likely
homosexuals. In current culture, open discrimination against homosexuals is increasingly

viewed with disfavor. See supra note 232 (discussing governmental entities who have indepen-

dently made such discrimination illegal).
242. The employer will be forced to interrogate their bias and act in a manner which
discourages others. The district court in Hopkins was concerned with the maintenance of a
system which gave credence and weight to gender stereotypes. 618 F. Supp. at 1119. This is
simply an extension of that concern to another set of stereotypes regarding sexual preference.
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They will be forced to step forward and admit their intolerance.

Their subterfuge will be lost.

4a

Both Burdine and Hopkins require the employer to show by

reasonably specific "objective evidence" the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his decision.2 44 While Burdine requires only that

the employer produce such a reason, Hopkins requires the employer
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the adverse em-

ployment decision would have been made in the absence of the impermissible motive; there the stereotype of aggressiveness. 45 If effeminacy in men is equated with aggressiveness in women, such a
case will shift to a Hopkins framework.
If the Hopkins framework applies, the employer must persuade
the court in two stages. First, in the absence of the stereotype of
effeminacy or aggressiveness, the same decision would have been
made. Objective factors of job performance often support the consid-

eration of the candidate for the employment opportunity. An employer using effeminacy or aggressiveness may be left with no other
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason other than homosexuality to
justify his decision.
Second, if left with no other reason than homosexuality to justify the adverse employment action, the employer must persuade the
court the person is a homosexual.2 46 An admission of homosexuality
will be fatal to any plaintiff since homosexuality constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment deci-

sion. 41 In the absence of such an employee admission, the employer,
in order to carry the rebuttal burden, will be forced to persuade the

trier of fact, with reasonably specific, "objective" evidence241 that a
243. This loss of subterfuge may, in some cases, be quite costly. Current estimates show
that gays have an average household income of $55,430 compared with a national average of
S32,144. 59.6% of gays are college educated compared with 20.3% of all Americans. Simmons Market Research Bureau Survey, USA Today, May 24, 1990, at 1. These communities
also have a well-organized set of protective organizations. Id. It is likely that employers who
openly discriminate on the basis of sexual preference will lose in money far more than they
gain in comfort. In a competitive industry such as accounting, no firm can afford to intentionally alienate such a potentially fertile source of accounts.
244. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (discussing the employer's burden).
245. This essentially requires the employer to persuade the factfinder that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is the actual reason for the adverse employment decision.
246. It is conceivable that the court will accept as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
that the employer thinks or believes the person is a homosexual. In order to prevail under such
a theory in light of Hopkins, the employer must persuade the court that something other than
the impermissible stereotype of effeminacy or aggressiveness leads him to that thought. It
would seem that something must persuasively imply homosexuality.
247. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text (discussing this in detail).
248. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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person's effeminate behavior is linked to that person's homosexuality
and not simply to his gender. Otherwise, the stereotype of effeminacy or aggressiveness may not be indulged. The Court has thus invited a future in which every effeminate man's or aggressive woman's sexual activities become the central issue of litigation.249
V.

CONCLUSION

In his first dissenting opinion as a Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court, Oliver Wendall Holmes observed: "Great cases, like hard
cases, make bad law. .

.

. Immediate interests exercise a hydraulic

pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and
before which even well settled principles of law will bend."2' 0 In
Hopkins, the Court bends the well-settled principles established in
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine so as to adapt them to mixed-motive cases.251
Professors Madek and O'Brien both overestimate and underestimate the influence of Hopkins. They overestimate the power of Hopkins in Title VII challenges to partnership decisions in several ways.
First, its power may be limited because of the ambiguity of the decision. The plurality and concurring opinions leave the legal community in doubt as to the nature of the evidence required, 52 the timing
of evidentiary presentations, 253 the relative burdens of plaintiff and
defendant 25 4 and the scope of application of the Hopkins scheme. 2 "
Second, because of the ease by which decision-makers in a partnership can eschew reliance on impermissible stereotypes, Hopkins may
have limited power.256 Third, while Professors Madek and O'Brien
recognize that Hopkins broadens an existing avenue of attack, they
fail to recognize that Watson and Ward's Cove have concurrently
249. It is not entirely unusual for the sexual activities of a plaintiff to become a central
issue of litigation. In rape cases, a defendant often endeavors to establish a plaintiff's voluntariness through evidence of plaintiff's past sexual activities or appearance at the time of the

rape. Nor is it unusual for courts and legislatures to find such circumstances undesirable. Indeed, some states have passed legislation prohibiting the submission of such evidence of victims' provocative dress or demeanor.
250. Northern See. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-401 (1903). In a Title VII
context, this sentiment was expressed by Chief Justice Burger dissenting in Weber. "It is often
observed that hard cases make bad law .... "[Hlard cases always tempt judges to exceed
the limits of their authority, as the Court does today by totally rewriting a crucial part of Title
VII to reach a 'desirable' result." 443 U.S. at 218 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

251. See generally supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text (discussing this in detail).

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
supra notes 5, 33-37 and accompanying text.
generally supra notes 157-250 and accompanying text,
generally supra notes 16-63 and accompanying text.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol8/iss1/2

44

19901

Wade: WomenWomen
Denied
Partnerships
Revisited: A Response to Professors
Mad
125
Denied
Partnerships

s57
engineered a parallel, perhaps more accessible, avenue of attack.

They underestimate the influence of Hopkins on other areas of
employment discrimination. The power of Hopkins will not be felt in

the limited area of partnership decisions. The primary force of Hopkins will be exerted along the periphery of disparate treatment cases;

closing the gaping flank of affirmative action25 while proving impetus to the ongoing struggle toward a workplace free from all forms of

discrimination and retaliatory threat.2 5 9 The plurality's immediate

interest in condemning inter-class and intra-class sex stereotyping
produced a scheme of litigation which threatens to make voluntary

affirmative action more difficult if not impossible,2 60 protection of
employees from retaliatory action more complete 261 and inadverfor protection of a group
tently creates a window of opportunity 262
protecting.
of
intention
no
Congress had

257. See generally supra notes 64-156 and accompanying text.
258. Affirmative action, while currently justified as good public policy or remedial action, still requires preferential treatment on the basis of membership in a racial, gender, religious or national origin class. As such, it acts as a prior restraint on an identified class',
namely non-minorities' employment opportunities. See generally supra notes 157-84 and accompanying text.
259. See generally supra notes 185-230 and accompanying text.
260. See generally supra notes 157-84 and accompanying text.
261. See generally supra notes 185-227 and accompanying text.
262. See generally supra notes 228-50 and accompanying text.
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